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This thesis extends previous research on validating Lanchester's equations with
real data. The quality of the available historical data for validation of attrition models is
poor. Most accessible battle data contain only starting sizes and casualties, sometimes
only for one side. A detailed database of the Battle of Kursk of World War II, the largest
tank battle in history, has recently been developed. The data were collected from military
archives in Germany and Russia by the Dupuy Institute (TDI) and were reformatted into
a computerized data base, designated as the Kursk Data Base (KDB), and recently made
available and documented in the KOSAVE (Kursk Operation Simulation and Validation
Exercise of the US Army) study. The data are two-sided, time phased (daily), and highly
detailed. They cover 15 days of the campaign. This thesis examines how the various
derivatives of Lanchester's equations fit the newly compiled database on the Battle of
Kursk. In addition, other functional forms are fit. These results are contrasted with
earlier studies on the Ardennes campaign. It turns out that a wide variety of models fit
the data about as well. Unfortunately, none of the basic Lanchester models fit the data,
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
War is a conflict between nations or states carried on by force of considerable
duration and magnitude, by land, sea, or air for obtaining and establishing the superiority
and dominion of one over the other for some cause. Throughout history, war has been a
topic of analysis for scientists and researchers, especially following World War II.
Soviets argue that Osipov [Ref.2] was the first to study and discover the equations
most often used when modeling attrition in combat. The equations are widely known as
"Lanchester's equations." Regardless of claims of prior or parallel discovery,
Lanchester's equations for attrition provided the origin for modeling attrition in the
United States and around the world. Today, with the advent of computers, Lanchester-
based models of warfare are widely used in the decisionmaking process for research,
development, acquisition of weapons systems, force mix decisions, and for aiding in the
development of operational plans.
The basic generalized Lanchester Equations are of the form [Ref.6]:
B{t) = aR(t) p B{t) q (1)
R(t)=bB{t) p R(t) q (2)
where B(t) and R(t) are the strengths of blue and red forces at time t, B(t) and R(t) are
the rates at which blue and red force levels are changing at time t, a and b are attrition
parameters, p is the exponent parameter of the attacking force, and q is the exponent
parameter of the defending force.
Two versions of the Lanchester equations are of particular interest. When p = q =
1, force ratios remain equal if aR(0) = bB(0), and hence this condition is called,
Lanchester's linear law. The interpretation of Lanchester's linear law is that a battle
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governed by this model is characterized as a collection of small engagements, and was
proposed by Lanchester as a model for ancient warfare. The equation is also considered a
good model for area fire weapons, such as artillery. Lanchester contrasted the Linear
Law with the condition p = 1, g = 0, which is called Lanchester's square law, where the
force ratios remain equal when aR(0) 2 = bB(0) 2 . He theorized that the square law
applies to modern warfare, in which both sides are able to aim their fire. His model
suggests that in modern warfare combatants should concentrate their forces. A third
version with/? = 0, q = 1 is called Lanchester's logarithmic law.
Past empirical validation studies of Lanchester Equations include the work of
Bracken on the Ardennes campaign of World War II, Fricker, also on the Ardennes
campaign, Clemens on the Battle of Kursk of World War II, and Hartley and Helmbold
on the Inchon-Seoul campaign of the Korean War. These works are among the few
quantitative studies that use daily force size data for real battles.
Bracken formulated four different models for the Ardennes campaign, which are
variations of the basic Lanchester equations, and estimated their parameters for the first
ten days of the of the Ardennes campaign (December 15, 1944 through January 16,
1945). He concluded that: (1) the Lanchester linear model best fits the Ardennes
campaign data, (2) when combat forces are considered, allied individual effectiveness is
greater than German individual effectiveness, (3) when total forces are considered,
individual effectiveness is the same for both sides, and (4) there is an attacker advantage
throughout the campaign.
Fricker' s paper revisited Bracken's modeling of the Ardennes campaign, using
linear regression to fit the total body of data from the entire campaign, including air sortie
data. Fricker concludes by saying that one side's losses are more a function of his own
forces than a function of the opponent's forces, like the logarithmic law, and gives the
Gulf War as an example to support this theory.
Clemens' analysis examined the validity of the Lanchester Models as they are
applied to modern warfare using data from the Battle of Kursk. His analysis is an
extension of Bracken's and Fricker's analyses of the Ardennes Campaign. He concludes
that the Lanchester logarithmic model in both scalar and matrix form fits better than the
Lanchester linear and square models.
Hartley and Helmbold tested Lanchester' s square law using the data from the
Inchon-Seoul campaign. They conclude that: (1) the data do not fit a constant coefficient.
Lanchester square law, (2) the data better fit a set of three separate battles (one distinct
battle every six or seven days), (3) Lanchester' s square law is not a proven attrition
algorithm for warfare (but neither can it be completely discounted), and (4) more real
combat data are needed to validate any proposed attrition law.
This thesis takes a closer look at Lanchester' s equations using recently available
data on the battle of Kursk. In July 1943, the Battle of Kursk, the largest tank battle in
history, took place around the city of Kursk, Russia, and ended in the defeat of the
Germans. A detailed database of this battle was recently developed. The data were
collected from military archives in Germany and Russia by the Dupuy Institiute (TDI),
and are reformatted into a computerized data base, designated as the Kursk Data Base
(KDB). KDB is recently documented in the KOSAVE (Kursk Operation Simulation and
Validation Exercise) study. The data are two-sided, time phased (daily), and highly
detailed. They cover 15 days of the Battle of Kursk.
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A total of 39 diverse models are fit to the Battle of Kursk data using different
approaches. These approaches include applying the methodologies of previous studies,
using robust LTS (least trimmed squares) regression for estimation purposes, including
air sortie data of the battle, considering the battle in separate phases, using different
weights to aggregate the data, fitting basic Lanchester equations, fitting Morse-Kimball
equations, and applying parameters found in previous studies.
The findings from this research include:
• It is observed that the original Lanchester equations do not fit to the Battle of
Kursk data, and therefore may not be appropriate for modeling the combat. Of
the three ill-fitting Lanchester equations, the best fit is obtained by applying the
linear law, which is used for modeling ancient warfare or area fire.
• The parameters derived from Bracken and Fricker's Ardennes studies do not
apply to the Battle of Kursk data. This implies that there are no unique
parameters that apply to all battles.
• Throughout the study, the a parameter is generally greater than the b parameter.
This implies that individually German soldiers were more lethal than Soviet
soldiers.
• The best fit to the data is observed when a robust LTS regression model is
applied. The best fit occurred with no attacker/defender advantage.
• In the battle of Kursk, except for the first and eighth days, it was advantageous to
be the attacker.
• The different approaches give very different estimates on the best fitting
Lanchester parameters (p, q, a, b); see Table 1 for a sample of the range of
Xll
parameters found. A closer investigation reveals that the surface of the sum
squared residuals (SSR), from the differences between the daily estimated and
real losses over the battle, is very flat. This explains why such diverse answers
are in the literature. Figure 1 shows a contour filled plot of SSR values for Battle
of Kursk data with p values varied between -0.5 and 10.0 and q values varied
between -1.0 and 4.0, and a and b values determined to minimize SSR given p
and q. Different researchers, using different methods, all came up with
completely different answers because the surface around the models' fits is very
flat. Therefore, small changes in handling the data and the application of different
estimation methodologies results in dramatically different parameter estimates.
Thus, there is not enough data from the battle of Kursk, and Ardennes too, to
differentiate between a wide range of Lanchester models. Unfortunately, none of




























2.27E-40 1.84E-41 6.0843 1.7312
Table 1 . Results for the 6 of the 39 models explored in the study. Notice the wide range
of parameter estimates.
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Combat models cannot provide clear-cut results to a military analyst. One cannot
determine the outcome of a battle precisely by using combat models. Together
with their use to gain insight about the battles and campaigns that happened in the
past, combat models help to make better decisions by enabling the decision-maker
to compare different alternatives using various combat modeling techniques.
Figure 1. Contour filled plot of SSR values for Battle of Kursk data with no
attacker/defender advantage considered. A wide range of diverse generalized Lanchester
models give about the same fit.
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LIST OF SYMBOLS, ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS
SP : Self Propelled
KDB : Kursk Database
OH : On hand
HQ : Headquarters
KIA : Killed In Action
WIA : Wounded In Action
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War is a conflict between nations or states carried on by force of considerable
duration and magnitude, by land, sea, or air for obtaining and establishing the superiority
and dominion of one over the other for some cause. It is defined more concisely as the
state of usually open and declared armed hostile conflict between states or nations
[Ref.l]. When these conflicts reach global proportions, they are known as world wars.
Among the causes of war are ideological, political, racial, economic, and religious
conflicts. According to Karl von Clausewitz, war is a "continuation of political
intercourse by other means" and often occurs after means of compromise and mediation
have failed.
Throughout history, war has been a topic of analysis for scientists and researchers,
especially following World War II. In the shadow of a possible outbreak of nuclear war
between the United States and Russia, more research has been done on the subject of war
than ever before.
A. COMBAT MODELING
This study, instead of analyzing the concept of war at large, will analyze and
focus on a smaller part of war, which we usually name combat, battle or campaign. Even
though these terms are generally used as if they had the same meaning, the word combat
is used for defining active, armed fighting between two enemy forces, while the word
battle is used for defining a hostile encounter or engagement between opposing military
forces. The word campaign is used for defining military operations lor a specific
objective, and defines a connected series of military operations aimed at accomplishing a
specific operational and strategic objective. A campaign forms a separate and distinct
phase of war, and it is this "small" part of war that is the concentration of this study.
Throughout history, combat has been an important topic of analysis, just like war
itself. Scientists, researchers, and the military have tried to understand and estimate
beforehand the nature of combat in order to formulate some theory about its dynamics
and most importantly, its outcome. Researchers who studied combat modeling and
attrition were aware of the influence their studies could have on the outcome of a battle.
A natural consequence of these studies was the emergence of combat models in the
beginning of the early 20th century.
Attrition is a reduction or decrease in number, size, or strength of a force and is at
the core of every general discussion of warfare. The term attrition defines a wearing
down or weakening of resistance, especially as a result of constant harassment, abuse, or
attack.
Soviets argue that Osipov [Ref.2] was the first to study and discover the equations
most often used when modeling attrition in combat. The equations are widely known as,
"Lanchester's equations." Regardless of claims of prior or parallel discovery,
Lanchester's equations for attrition provided the origin for modeling attrition in the
United States and around the world.
Frederick William Lanchester (b.1868, London, England; d.1946, Birmingham,
Warwickshire) was an English automobile and aeronautics pioneer who built the first
British automobile in 1896. Lanchester's interest in aeronautics was first expressed in a
paper he wrote in 1897, a work ahead of its time discussing the principles of heavier-
than-air flight. Between 1907-1908, he published a two-volume work embodying
distinctly advanced aerodynamic ideas. As a member of the Advisory Committee on
Aeronautics in 1909 and, later, as a consultant to the Daimler Motor Company, Ltd.,
Lanchester also contributed to the development of the field of operations research.
[Ref.3].
Lanchester proposed that attrition could be mathematically modeled, and
introduced his equations as a means of investigating the future impact that the recently
invented airplane might have on the nature of warfare [Ref.4]. Thus, at the beginning of
World War II, Lanchester equations and other differential equations of a similar nature
were known to some of the scientists who later became active in operations research
[Ref.5].
Today, with the advent of computers, Lanchester-based models of warfare are
widely used in the decision making process for research, development, acquisition of
weapons systems, force mix decisions, and for aiding in the development of operational
plans.
B. LANCHESTER EQUATIONS
As described in Fricker [Ref.6], the basic generalized Lanchester Equations are of
the form:
B(t) = aR(t) p B(ty (1)
R(t) = bB(t) p R(t) q (2)
where B(t) and R(t) are the strengths of blue and red forces at time t, B(t) and R(t) are
the rates at which blue and red force levels are changing at time t, a and b are attrition
parameters, p is the exponent parameter of the attacking force, and q is the exponent
parameter of the defending force. The model begins with initial force sizes, B(0) and
R(0), that, when solved numerically, are incrementally decreased according to the
relationship B(t+At) = B(t) - AtB(t) and R(t+At) = R(t) - AtR(t) . In an equally matched
battle, where the ratio of the forces stays constant over time, B(t)/R(t) = B{t)l R(t) , for




for some p and q,
and all t.
Two versions of the Lanchester equations are of particular interest. When p = q =
1 (or, more generally, when p-q = 0) force ratios remain equal if aR(0) = bB(0) , and
hence this condition is called, Lanchester's linear law. The interpretation of Lanchester'
s
linear law is that a battle governed by this model is characterized as a collection of small
engagements, and was proposed by Lanchester [Ref.4] as a model for ancient warfare.
The equation is also considered a good model for area fire weapons, such as artillery
[Ref.7].
Lanchester contrasted the Linear Law with the condition p = 1 , q = (or, more
generally, p-q = 1), which is called Lanchester 's square law, where the force ratios
remain equal when aR(0) 2 = bB(0) 2 . He theorized that the square law applies to modern
warfare, in which both sides are able to aim their fire. His model suggests that in modern
warfare, combatants should concentrate their forces.
A third version with p = 0, q - 1 (or, more generally, q-p = 1) is called
Lanchester's logarithmic law.
C. THESIS OUTLINE
This thesis consists of five chapters. This first chapter introduces the general
concept of combat modeling and the widely used Lanchester Equations. The second
chapter reviews previous studies on combat modeling. The Battle of Kursk data is also
introduced in this chapter, and the study methodology for the thesis is explained. The
third chapter briefly covers the history of Battle of Kursk, and explores and analyzes the
battle's data in depth to gain insights before attempting to fit models to it. Additional
details about the personnel and weapon systems data is given in Appendix A.
The primary objective of Chapter Four is to find the best model that fits the
Battle of Kursk data. To accomplish this objective, the methods of previous studies are
applied, and then all new exploratory models are implemented. The results derived from
the regression analysis methods are briefly evaluated in this chapter. The fifth chapter
interprets the results that are derived from the regression analysis methods in Chapter
Four. Chapter Five contains the final conclusions and recommendations implicated by
results, and also mentions future areas of study on combat modeling.
THIS PAGE IS LEFT INTENTIONALLY BLANK
II. PREVIOUS STUDIES ON COMBAT MODELING
A. PREVIOUS STUDIES WITH LANCHESTER EQUATIONS
Past empirical validation studies of Lanchester Equations include the work of
Bracken [Ref.8] on the Ardennes campaign of World War II, Fricker [Ref.6], also on the
Ardennes campaign, Clemens [Ref.9] on the Battle of Kursk of World War II, and
Hartley and Helmbold [Ref.10] on the Inchon-Seoul campaign of the Korean War. These
works are among the few quantitative studies that use daily force size data for real battles.
1. Bracken's study
Bracken formulates four different models [Ref.8] for the Ardennes campaign,
which are variations of basic Lanchester equations, and estimates their parameters for the.
first ten days of the of the Ardennes campaign of World War II (December 15, 1944
through January 16, 1945).
Bracken's models are homogeneous. Tanks, armored personnel carriers, artillery,
and manpower are aggregated with weights representing the relative effectiveness of the
weapon systems. This type of aggregation yields a single measure of strength for each of
the Allied and German forces. This method is used to measure combat power and to
calculate losses. His models treat combat forces and the total forces (i.e., both support
forces and the combat forces) in the campaign separately.
Equations II.A. 1.(3), II.A. 1.(4) show the Lanchester equations used by Bracken,
which are modified to include the tactical parameter d for Bracken's Model 1 and Model
2. The parameter d is a multiplier of attrition due to being either in a defensive or
offensive posture in the battle. If d < 1, then the defender has fewer casualties (i.e., there
is a defender advantage). If d > 1 then the defender has more casualties (i.e., there is an
attacker advantage). If d=l then there is no attacker or defender advantage. Using the
tactical parameter d requires knowing which side is the defender and which side is the
attacker.
B = (dorl/d)a R pBq (3)
R = (l/dord)b BpRq (4)
In Model 1, forces are composed of tanks, APCs, artillery, and combat manpower;
where combat manpower is made up of infantry, armor, and artillery personnel.
Manpower casualties are killed and wounded. Forces are tanks, APCs, artillery, and
combat manpower, which are weighted by 20, 5, 40, and 1, respectively. That is, Blue
Forces (combat power) = (20 x number of tanks) + (5 x number of APCs) + (40 x
number of artillery) + (1 x number of combat manpower). Bracken [Ref.8] states in his
study that, "The weights given above are consistent with those of studies and models of
the U.S. Army Concepts Analysis Agency. Virtually all theater-level dynamic combat
simulation models incorporate similar weights, either as inputs or as decision parameters
computed as the simulations progress."
In Model 2, forces include all personnel in the campaign, including all types of
logistics and support personnel. Casualties are personnel who are killed, wounded,
captured or missing in action, and who have disease and nonbattle injuries. It is
noteworthy here to mention that in the Ardennes campaign, the Allies had a smaller
portion of their forces in combat units and a larger portion of their forces in logistics and
support units than the Germans.
In estimating the parameters of Model 1 , Bracken found that individual German
effectiveness, as measured by the attrition parameter a, is less than Allied effectiveness b;
these parameters are for combat forces only. This distinction is a natural result of the
German combat forces having less support, and therefore not being as effective as Allied
combat forces individually. In Model 2 where all personnel are included, individual
effectiveness is determined to be similar for both the Allied forces and the Germans.
In Model 3, the components used are the same as in Model 1, but the parameter d
is not estimated. Just like Model 3, Model 4 does not have a tactical parameter. Model 4,
like Model 2, addresses total forces rather than combat forces. For a summary of







MODEL 1 X X
MODEL2 X X X
MODEL3 X
MODEL4 X X
Table 2. Bracken's models summarized. Model 1 and Model 3 use combat manpower
only; Model 2 and Model 4 use total manpower. Combat manpower is made up of
infantry, armor, and artillery personnel; support manpower is made up of all types of
logistics and support personnel. Model 1 and Model 2 have defensive parameter d;
Model 3 and Model 4 do not have d.
Bracken's main conclusions are:
• Lanchester linear model best fits the Ardennes campaign data in all four
cases.
• When combat forces are considered, Allied individual effectiveness is
greater than German individual effectiveness. When total forces are
considered, individual effectiveness is the same for both sides.
• There is an attacker advantage.
The second result indicates that the two sides have essentially the same individual
capabilities but are organized differently. The Allies preferred to have more manpower
in the support forces, which in turn yielded greater individual capabilities in the combat
forces. The overall superiority of the Allied forces in the campaign led to the Allied
attrition being a smaller percentage of their forces. Table 3 shows Bracken's best fitting




















8.0E-9 8.0E-9 1.2 0.8 -
Table 3. Brae cen's paramete rs found in his s»tudy for Ardennes campaign data.
2. Flicker's study
Fricker's paper [Ref.6] revisits Bracken's modeling of the Ardennes campaign of
World War II [Ref.8] and uses the Lanchester equations. This is different than Bracken's
study in several ways. Fricker's study:
• Uses linear regression to fit the model parameters.
• Uses the total body of data from the entire campaign, while Bracken used
only the first 10 days of the data from the Ardennes Campaign.
• Also includes air sortie data.
In contrast to Bracken, Fricker shows that the Lanchester linear and square laws
do not fit the data. He concludes by showing that a new form of the Lanchester
equations—with a physical interpretation—fits best. Fricker states that the attrition
parameter used in the Lanchester logarithmic model represents the opponent's probability
of killing a soldier, and that this probability of kill is constant for a certain range of the
opponent's force sizes. It follows that one side's losses are more a function of own
forces rather than a result of the opponent's forces, and Fricker gives the Gulf War as
support for this theory. That is, Iraqi casualties were more a function of the number of
Iraqi forces than of the number of Allied forces. Table 4 shows the best fitting parameters




















1.3E-15 5.6E-15 0.0 3.0 0.8197
Table 4. Fricker' s parameters from his study of the Ardennes campaign data. The
estimated d parameter indicates a defender advantage. The d parameter used in Fricker'
s
study is the inverse of the d parameter defined in Bracken's study.
3. Clemens' study
Clemens' analysis [Ref.9] examines the validity of the Lanchester Models as they
are applied to modern warfare. The models in his study are based upon basic Lanchester
Equations. The analysis is an extension of Bracken's [Ref.8] and Fricker's [Ref.6]
analyses of the Ardennes Campaign, and applies the Lanchester models to the Battle of
Kursk data.
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Clemens uses two estimation techniques, linear regression and Newton-Raphson
iteration. The analysis also explores the presented model in matrix form, and compares
the matrix solution to the scalar solution. In his study he concludes that:
• Neither the Lanchester linear nor the Lanchester square model fits the
data.
• The Lanchester logarithmic model in both scalar and matrix form fits
better than the Lanchester linear and square models.
• Lanchester Equations do not give the best fit for the data.
• The analysis can be extended by:
Taking into account the change in offensive/defensive roles.
Adding data from air sorties.
Applying the Lanchester Equations in a homogeneous weapon
scenario.
Building a whole new model without regard to the Lanchester
formulations.
Table 5 shows the best fitting parameters Clemens found for the Battle of Kursk












3.73E-6 5.91E-6 0.0 1.6178 -
Table 5. Clemens' parameters found in his study for the Battle of Kursk Data.
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4. Hartley and Helmbold's study
Hartley and Helmbold's study [Ref.10] focuses on validating the homogenous
Lanchester square law by using historical combat data. Since validating a model means
testing it in a real life context, Hartley and Helmbold test Lanchester' s square law using
the data from the Inchon-Seoul campaign of the Korean War.
Hartley and Helmbold use three analysis techniques to examine the data; linear
regression, the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC), and Bozdogan's consistent AIC
(CAIC). The results of the study are:
• The data do not fit a constant coefficient Lanchester square law.
• The data better fit a set of three separate battles (one distinct battle every
six or seven days). However, the data fit a set of three constant casualty-
model battles just as well.
• Lanchester square law is not a proven attrition algorithm for warfare, but
neither can it be completely discounted.
• More real combat data are needed to validate any proposed attrition law
such as the Lanchester square law.
5. A summary of previous findings
Fricker's and Bracken's studies are significant in that they reach different
conclusions using the same data. When both studies are compared, Fricker's approach
and methodology makes more sense because he did not constrain himself to certain
ranges of parameters, as Bracken did.
Bracken's approach is strong in the sense that his approach optimizes the
nonlinear regression equation in the defined area. Fricker finds the parameters that give
13
the minimum sum of squared residuals (SSR), using the logarithmically transformed
Lanchester equations. Using logarithmic transformation does not necessarily guarantee
the best fit when the parameters found by this approach are directly applied to the
Lanchester equations. However, minimizing the SSR value was Bracken's criteria and
the parameters found via logarithmic transformation in Fricker always resulted in smaller
sums of square errors for the untransformed Lanchester equations than those found by
Bracken.
In general, the results of all four studies show no overwhelming evidence of
Lanchester fit. Among the three Lanchester equations, the logarithmic law gives the best
fit.
B. THE DATA AND STUDY METHODOLOGY
1. The data
Complete combat data on both sides fighting against each other is very sparse.
Consequently, validation of Lanchester and other combat models has been very difficult,
and the most accessible battle data contains only starting sizes and casualties, sometimes
only for one side. Furthermore, the definition of casualties varies (e.g., killed, killed plus
wounded, killed plus wounded plus missing, killed plus wounded plus missing plus
disease/nonbattle injuries), making data analysis difficult. Obtaining order-of-battle data
and equipment damage reports requires extensive historical research. Recently, more
data has become available and improved database management and computing power has
helped in such data gathering efforts.
A detailed database of the Battle of Kursk of World War II, the largest tank battle
in history, was recently developed. The data were collected from military archives in
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Germany and Russia by the Dupuy Institiute (TDI), and are reformatted into a
computerized data base, designated as the Kursk Data Base (KDB). The KDB was
recently documented in the KOSAVE (Kursk Operation Simulation and Validation
Exercise) study. [Ref. 12]. The data are two-sided, time phased (daily), and highly
detailed. They cover 15 days of the Battle of Kursk.
2. Study methodology
This thesis fits Lanchester equations and other functional forms to the newly
released Battle of Kursk data. The two main areas of interest are the quality of the fits
and the insights provided by the equations. Different fits are compared and contrasted to
the previous research results mentioned above.
The methodology used in this thesis research consists of the following steps and
research questions:
• Arranging and setting up of the data at hand so that it is useful for
regression and statistical purposes.
• Conducting a thorough analysis and interpretation of the data.
• Identifying components needed for the model.
• Applying Bracken's and Fricker's methodology to the Kursk data.
• Applying various forms of Lanchester Equations to the data. How well do
Lanchester Equations fit the Battle of Kursk Data?
Does the Linear Law fit the Battle of Kursk data?
Does the Square Law fit the Battle of Kursk data?
Does the Logarithmic Law fit the Battle of Kursk data?
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Do possible combinations of these three laws fit the Battle of
Kursk data?
• Applying other general curve fittings and functional forms to the data.
• Do any of the other possible general curve fits or functional forms fit the
Battle of Kursk data?
Do any of the functional forms need the defender/attacker
coefficient?
What effect does changing weapon weights have on fitting the
models to the data?
• Using a least squares grid search to get a better understanding of the
relationship between various Lanchester formulation and the empirical
data.
• Comparing and contrasting different methodologies and the two battles.
• Analyzing the results and conclusions of all the models.
This thesis extends the previous studies of Bracken, Fricker, Clemens, and
Hartley and Helmbold in the following ways:
Methodologies of previous studies are applied to Battle of Kursk data.
A different regression technique, i.e., robust LTS regression, is used.
Air sortie data is included.
The change in offensive/defensive roles is taken into account.
The battle is considered in different phases and different change points are
used for fitting the model.
Different weights are used for aggregating the data.
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Lanchester Equations, Morse-Kimball equations and force ratio models
are fit to Battle of Kursk data
Parameters found for different battles are used to fit Battle of Kursk data
and the resulting parameters are compared and contrasted. By this
comparison, the issue of whether or not the parameters of one battle can be
used for another battle is discussed.
17
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III. HISTORY AND THE DATA OF THE BATTLE OF KURSK
A. SHORT HISTORY OF THE BATTLE OF KURSK
1. City of Kursk
The city of Kursk is the administrative center of Kursk Province in western
Russia. It lies along the upper Seym River, about 280 miles south of Moscow. First
mentioned in documents from 1032, Kursk is one of the oldest cities in Russia (Figure 2).
Completely destroyed by the Tatars in 1240, Kursk was not rebuilt until 1586, when it
became a military outpost protecting the advancing Russian colonization from Tatar
attack. The town, however, lost much of its importance at the beginning of the 18th
century when the Russian border was moved farther south. In World War II, fierce
fighting took place around Kursk and the city was severely damaged (Figure 3). In July,
1943, the Battle of Kursk, the largest tank battle in World War II, took place around the
city of Kursk and ended in the defeat of the Germans. [Ref.13].
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Figure 2. Location of city of Kursk shown in two different scaled maps. Arrows point to
the plus signs showing the city's exact location. [Ref.l4][Ref.l5].
2. The history of the Battle of Kursk
During World War II, following the German defeat in Stalingrad, the military
situation in the Eastern Front was much different than it was the year before. After
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Figure 3. Monument to World War II dead in the city of Kursk, Russia [Ref. 13]
Stalingrad, the Russians knew they were going to win the war, and the Germans strongly
suspected they might lose the war. The war was in mid-course—the outcome might be
predictable, but the Germans were far from beaten. The Germans were still mighty,
powerful and dangerous. In the spring of 1943, the Eastern Front was dominated by a
salient located to the north of city of Kharkov, to the south of city of Orel, and centered
on the city of Kursk. The Kursk salient was 250 miles wide and 70 miles deep. The
German plan was a two-front attack on the Kursk salient in a classic pincer operation.
Operation Citadel was launched on July 5, 1943. On July 2, 1943, Adollf Hitler
said, "This attack is of decisive importance. It must succeed, and it must do so rapidly
and convincingly. It must secure for us the initiative for this spring and summer. The
victory of Kursk must be a blazing torch to the world." [Ref. 16: p. 103].
With the objectives of destroying Soviet forces and eliminating the salient by
linking up the area around the city of Kursk, General Model's 9th Army attacked from the
north, while General Hoth's 4th Panzer Army attacked from south of the salient. The
20
Soviets had enough time to prepare heavily fortified defense lines because of frequent
German planning delays, and this advantage was a major setback for the Germans that
contributed to their defeat in this battle. (See the map in Figure 4).
General Model's 9th Army's attack from the north gained approximately 6 miles
of ground into the enemy lines before being stopped on Day 4. Following Day 4, the
German attack on the northern front was stalled. General Hoth's 4th Panzer Army's
attack from the south was more successful. Following an initial gain of a few miles in the
first two days of the battle, the 4th Panzer Army caused great damage and alarm among
the Soviets. Despite their heavy losses, the Soviets were able to restrict German progress
to a mere 25 miles by July 12. A German breakthrough attempt on July 12 resulted in the
greatest single armored engagement in history near the town of Prokhorovka, when
Germans ran into the advancing 5 th Guards Tank Army, which was the Soviet theater
reserve (i.e., the biggest Soviet reserve force in the battlefield at the time).
As night closed over Prokhorovka, the greatest armored battle in history had
fought itself out. The field was strewn with more than 300 German tanks, including 70 of
the huge Tigers, 88 SP guns and 300 trucks. Rotmisrov's 5 th Guards Tank Army had
suffered a 50 percent loss of his 850 tanks and SP guns. The dazed Germans described
the day as the Bluthmahle von Belgorod (the bloodbath at Belgorod). Unable to gain a
decisive victory, and stopped by Soviet reinforcements and counterattacks, the Germans
drew back into defensive postures after this battle. [Ref. 16][Ref.l7].
While the number of German tank losses cited in historical sources is around 300,
this is different than the number of German tank losses given in the KDB, which is 98.
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Figure 4. Operation Zitadelle and the Withdrawal to the Hagen Position. [Ref.17 : p. 134]
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Hitler's orders to cancel Citadel on July 13, 1943 came as a shock to the German
field commanders, and consequently, further attacks were limited in scope. The Soviets
began their counterattack on the southern front on July 12, and regained all ground lost in
the theater by July 23, 1943.
Soviet military historians named the Battle of Kursk as "the Nazi Waterloo".
Following this Battle, the military situation in the Eastern Front got worse for the
Germans. Detailed information about the military aspects of the Battle of Kursk can be
found in [Ref.16] and [Ref.17].
B. BATTLE OF KURSK DATA
The data presented in KOSAVE (Kursk Operation Simulation and Validation
Exercise) [Ref.12] consists of mainly 6 parts:
Units and combat posture status.
Personnel status and casualties.
Army weapons status and losses.
Ammunition status.
Aircraft sortie status.
Geographic unit positions and progress.
1. Limitations and timeframe of the Kursk database
The KDB in the KOSAVE report includes quantified data only on the southern
front of the Kursk Battle. Results are not expressed in terms of specific weapon types,
and weapons are aggregated into categories or classes for tractability. Human factors like
fatigue, morale, caution, aggressiveness, regulating the pace and intensity of battle are not
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quantified. The data given is for 15 days of battle, from 4 July 1943 through 18 July
1943. [Ref.12].
2. Assumptions made for Kursk database
The KDB accurately represents the status and structure of forces in the southern
front of the actual World War II Battle of Kursk. The personnel casualty and system kill
criteria used to categorize KDB casualty and weapon losses are sufficiently consistent
with each other to allow meaningful reporting and comparisons between combatants.
The use of interpolation techniques for gathering data between inconsistent reports in
historical records create a complete set of daily report records in the KDB is reasonable.
[Ref.12].
3. Phases of the battle
With the start of the battle on July 4, 1943, German forces encountered heavy
losses as they fell upon the fortified Soviet positions. The Germans were able to advance
only 10 miles south and 30 miles north into the salient before the offensive stalled. The
Soviets mounted their counterattack on July 12, and by July 18, had decisively won the
battle. Soviets retained the initiative and used it to dominate the Eastern Front until the
end of the war. In summary, the days of attack and defense are:
• July 4 - July 1 1 = day 1 - day 8 of the battle = Germans attack
• July 12 - July 18 = day 9- day 15 of the battle = Soviets attack
Throughout the thesis, the Soviet forces are known as Blue forces German forces
as Red forces.
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C. METHODOLOGY USED FOR GATHERING DATA
The critical data is extracted from the KOSAVE [Ref.13] report, and aggregated
depending on the model used in the study. This process was the most difficult and time-
consuming process of the study. Extracting only that information needed from an
immense database demands great attention to detail and methodology. The methodology
of how the data is gathered for modeling purposes is explained in detail in the section
concerning that specific model. The general outlines, which do not change for every
model, are explained in III.C.l and III.C.2. All data used in this study are for combat
units represented in the KDB. Support units, such as bridging and logistics units, are
excluded [Ref.12].
1. Manpower data
Throughout the study, combat manpower is used for modeling the combat. The
manpower presented as "On Hand" (OH) in the KOSAVE [Ref.12] report is summed up,
including the headquarters units, and is assumed to be the number of combat forces.
Thus the number of combat forces is assumed to represent all the combat forces available
on hand. Combat manpower losses are killed, wounded, captured/missing in action, and
disease and nonbattle injuries.
Table 6 shows the combat manpower data for the Soviet forces and Table 7 shows
the combat manpower data for the German forces.
2. Weapon systems data
Throughout this study, the total number of weapon systems is used for modeling
purposes. The weapon systems presented as OH in the KOSAVE [Ref.12] report are
summed up, including the weapon systems of headquarter units, and assumed to be the
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total number weapon systems. The total number of weapon systems is assumed to
represent all the weapon systems available on hand, including the weapon systems of
headquarter units.
Day OH Manpower KIA WIA CMIA DNBI Total
1 510252 30 73 11 16 130
2 507698 1616 3548 3281 82 8527
3 498884 1911 3861 3553 98 9423
4 489175 2160 4949 3230 92 10431
5 481947 2069 4767 2585 126 9547
6 470762 2613 6451 2561 211 11836
7 460808 2326 5189 3209 46 10770
8 453126 1792 4488 1417 57 7754
9 433813 4417 11450 3496 59 19422
10 423351 2205 6709 1556 52 10522
11 415254 2153 5315 1206 49 8723
12 419374 822 2641 575 38 4076
13 416666 619 1928 358 35 2940
14 415461 225 846 111 35 1217
15 413298 881 2198 151 30 3260
TOTAL 25839 64413 27300 1026 118578
Table 6. Soviet combat manpower data. KIA denotes killed in




Day OH Manpower KIA WIA CMIA DNBI Total
1 307365 129 516 12 143 800
2 301341 960 4817 272 143 6192
3 297205 565 3375 217 145 4302
4 293960 475 2726 70 143 3414
5 306659 503 2202 75 162 2942
6 303879 492 2201 100 160 2953
7 302014 304 1532 43 161 2040
8 300050 345 1893 68 169 2475
9 298710 420 1944 86 162 2612
10 299369 327 1533 33 158 2051
11 297395 338 1584 63 155 2140
12 296237 220 912 31 159 1322
13 296426 214 920 27 189 1350
14 296350 138 622 26 163 949
15 295750 161 707 19 167 1054
TOTAL 5591 27484 1142 2379 36596
Table 7. German combat
wounded in action, CMIA
and nonbattle injuries.
manpower data. KIA denotes killed in action, WIA denotes
denotes captured/missing in action and DNBI denotes disease
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Weapon losses are destroyed/abandoned and damaged. In the example presented,
considering a damaged weapon system as a loss is logical, because a damaged weapon
system is considered to be a "temporary" loss and in a non-operational status. Therefore,
damaged weapons are also included when calculating the losses of both sides. A damaged
weapon system is treated as only a "temporary" loss, but the period of non-operational
status can be long. Also, a damaged operational system will often function only with
degraded effectiveness and efficiency. [Ref.12: p.5-13].
Likewise, since a damaged weapon is damaged "in action" and is left out of the
battle indefinitely due to its non-operational status until repaired, it will be considered as
a loss. "Damaged" denotes number of items damaged in action. [Ref.12: p. H-l].
In order to prevent possible confusion for future analysts, the methodology used
while gathering data for the classification of weapon systems will be offered. The type of
each weapon system is listed below. Table 5-1 [Ref.12: p. 5-3], Table 5-2 [Ref.12: p.5-4],
and the tables from the weapons lists in the Appendices of the KOSAVE II Study Report
[Ref.12] are used for purposes of classification. The results are as follows.
a. Classification of Soviet weapon systems
(1) Tanks used in the study:
• KV-l.KV-2
• M-3, MK-2/3, MK-4
• T-34, T-60, T-70












Classification ofGerman weapon systems
( 1
)
Tanks used in the study:
• PzIII(all types), PzIV(all types), PzV(all types),
PzVI(all types)
• T-34(Soviet), Pzfflspt
(2) APCs used in the study:
• AC4-6w, AC8w
• LHT, MHT, LHTspt, MHTspt
• Acspt, AC8w 75mm
• MHT75mmIG
• Pz I, Pz II
• MHT Flame
(3) Artillery used in the study:
• 75mm It IG
• 105mm Gun, 150mm Gun
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• 87.6mm How, 105mm How(towed and SP),
• 150mm How, 152mm How, 155mm How, 210mm
How
• Wespe (is a SP Artillery Gun with 105mm Light
Field Howitzer)
• Hummel (is a 150mm SP Gun)
Using the methodology explained above, the necessary data is gathered from the
KOSAVE [Ref.12] report. The data for the tank, APC and the artillery weapon systems
for the Soviet forces are given in Table 8, Table 9 and Table 10, consecutively. The data
for the tank, APC and the artillery weapon systems for the German forces are given in
Table 11, Table 12 and Table 13, consecutively.
Day OH Tanks Damaged Dst+Abnd Total Loss
1 2500
2 2396 19 86 105
3 2367 69 48 117
4 2064 120 139 259
5 1754 100 215 315
6 1495 149 140 289




9 977 210 204 414
10 978 58 59 117
11 907 57 61 118
12 883 45 51 96
13 985 9 18 27
14 978 16 26 42
15 948 58 27 85
TOTAL 1038 1238 2276
Table 8. Soviet tank data. Dst+Abnd denotes destroyed and abandoned tanks. OH
denotes the on hand amount.
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Day OHAPC Damaged Dst+Abnd Total Loss
1 511
2 507 4 4
3 501 6 6
4 490 2 9 11
5 477 1 12 13
6 458 12 7 19
7 463 3 3
8 462 2 2 4
9 432 15 15 30
10 424 2 6 8
11 418 2 6 8
12 417 1 1
13 417
14 417 2 2
15 409 6 2 8
TOTAL 44 73 117
Table 9. Soviet APC data. Dst+Abnd denotes destroyed and abandoned APCs.
denotes the on hand amount.
OH
Day OH Artillery Damaged Dst+Abnd Total Loss
1 718
2 705 2 11 13
3 676 2 28 30
4 661 7 8 15
5 648 2 12 14
6 640 9 9
7 629 1 12 13
8 628 1 6 7
9 613 2 14 16
10 606 3 7 10
11 603 5 5
12 601 2 3 5
13 600 3 3
14 602
15 591 4 4
TOTAL 22 122 144
Table 10. Soviet artillery data.
OH denotes the on hand amount.
Dst+Abnd denotes destroyed and abandoned artillery.
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Day OH Tanks Damaged Dst+Abnd Total Loss
1 1178 2 2 4
2 986 175 23 198
3 749 216 32 248
4 673 107 14 121
5 596 92 16 108
6 490 107 32 139
7 548 32 4 36
8 563 48 15 63
9 500 89 9 98
10 495 50 7 57
11 480 32 14 46
12 426 70 9 79
13 495 15 8 23
14 557 6 1 7
15 588 6 6
TOTAL 1047 186 1233
Table 11. German tank data. Dst+Abnd denotes destroyed and abandoned tanks. OH
denotes the on hand amount.
Day OHAPC Damaged Dst+Abnd Total Loss
1 1170
2 1142 23 6 29
3 1128 13 1 14
4 1101 16 11 27
5 1085 14 2 16
6 1073 12 2 14
7 1114 33 9 42
8 1104 12 4 16
9 1099 3 9 12
10 1096 3 4
11 1093 5 6
12 1089 4 5
13 1092 1
14 1095 1
15 1098 4 5
TOTAL 142 50 192
Table 12. Germaii APC data. DsH-Abnd denotes de stroyed and abancloned APCs. OH
denotes the on hand amount.
31
Day OH Artillery Damaged Dst+Abnd Total Loss
1 1189 1 1
2 1166 10 14 24
3 1161 2 3 5
4 1154 3 4 7
5 1213 9 4 13
6 1210 4 2 6
7 1199 9 3 12
8 1206 4 11 15
9 1194 1 11 12
10 1187 2 5 7
11 1184 5 5
12 1183 1 2 3
13 1179 4 4
14 1182 2 2
15 1182 6 5 11
TOTAL 56 71 127
Table 13. German artillery data. Dst+Abnd denotes destroyed and abandoned artillery.
OH denotes the on hand amount.
D. COMPARISON OF MANPOWER AND WEAPON SYSTEMS
1. Personnel statistics
This section presents statistics on Soviet and German personnel strength and
casualties during the campaign for the purpose of gaining insight about the Battle of
Kursk.
a. On handpersonnel
Figure 5 shows daily OH personnel for both forces in the southern front of
the Battle of Kursk, as represented in the KDB. The OH total includes all personnel,




Figures 6 and 7 show daily and cumulative total casualties for both sides















D Soviet OH Personnel
German OH Personnel
Figure 5. Daily total OH personnel for Soviet and German forces. Notice the steady
decline in number of Soviet OH personnel until they counterattacked on July 12.
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Figure 6. Daily total personnel casualty. Notice the great amount of casualties the
Soviets had on July 12. Following this day, the battle lost its intensity for both sides.
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both committed and uncommitted. When initial forces are considered, total casualties
amounted to 23 percent of the initial Soviet force and 12 of the initial German force.
Overall, the Soviets had three (3.24) casualties for every one German casualty.
Cumulative Personnel Casulties
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Figure 7. Comparison of daily cumulative number of total personnel casualties. There is
a sharp increase in the number of Soviet casualties on July 12.
For more detailed information about the type of casualties, see Appendix A Part
2. Tank statistics
This section presents statistics on Soviet and German tank weapon system
strength and losses during the campaign for the purpose of gaining insight about the
Battle of Kursk.
a. On hand tanks
Figure 8 shows daily OH tanks for both sides in the southern front of the
Battle of Kursk, as represented in the KDB. The number of OH tanks includes all tanks,
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Figure 8. Comparison of daily number of total OH tanks. The Battle of Kursk was a
major tank battle. Notice the sharp decline in the number of tanks for both sides in the
first half of the battle.
b. Tank losses
Figures 9 and 10 show daily and cumulative total tank losses, respectively,
for both sides in the southern front of the Battle of Kursk. When initial forces are
considered, total tank losses amounted to 91 (0.910) percent of the initial amount of
Soviet tanks and 104 (1.046) percent of the initial amount of German tanks (i.e. the
Germans lost more tanks than their initial number of tanks). Overall, the Soviets lost
almost 2 (1.84) tanks for every German tank lost.
3. Armored personnel carrier statistics
This section presents statistics on Soviet and German APC weapon system
strength and losses during the campaign for the purpose of gaining insight about the
Battle of Kursk.
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Figure 9. Comparison of daily number of tank losses. Notice the enormous number of
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Figure 10. Comparison of daily cumulative number of tank losses. The Soviets lost
almost 25% of their OH tanks on day 9.
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a. On hand armored personnel carrier
Figure 1 1 shows daily OH APC for both sides in the southern front of the
Battle of Kursk, as represented in the KDB. The number of OH APCs includes all APC,
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Figure 1 1. Comparison of daily number of total OH APCs. The number of Soviet OH
APCs showed a general decline throughout the battle.
b. Armoredpersonnel carrier losses
Figures 12 and 13 show daily and cumulative total APC losses,
consecutively, for both sides in the southern front of the Battle of Kursk. When initial
forces are considered, total APC losses amounted to 23 (22.89) percent of the initial
amount of Soviet APCs and 16 (16.41) percent of the initial amount of German APCs.
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Figure 12. Comparison of daily number of APC losses. Notice the high number of
German APC losses on day 7 and the high number of Soviet APC losses on day 9. Both
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Figure 13. Comparison of daily cumulative number of APC losses. Throughout the
battle, Germans lost more APCs than the Soviets did.
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4. Artillery statistics
This section presents statistics on Soviet and German Artillery weapon system
strength and losses during the campaign for the purpose of gaining insight about the
Battle of Kursk.
a. On hand artillery
Figure 14 shows daily OH Artillery for both sides in the southern front of
the Battle of Kursk, as represented in the KDB. The number of OH artillery includes all
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Figure 14. Comparison of daily number of total OH artillery. The number of German
artillery was higher than the number of Soviet artillery throughout the battle.
b. Artillery losses
Figures 15 and 16 show daily and cumulative total artillery losses,
consecutively, for both sides in the southern front of the Battle of Kursk. When initial
forces are considered, total artillery losses amounted to 20 (0.200) percent of the initial
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amount of Soviet artillery and 11 (0.106) percent of the initial amount of German
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Figure 15. Comparison of daily number of artillery losses. German artillery loss was
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Figure 16. Comparison of daily cumulative number of artillery losses. Soviet artillery
losses began to increase on the third day and remained higher throughout the battle.
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For more detailed information about the type of losses for the tank, APC and
artillery weapon systems, both for the Germans and Soviets, see Appendix A Part B, Part
C and Part D, respectively.
5. Air sorties
The air sortie data given in the KOSAVE [Ref.12] report consists of the number
of air-air role sorties, ground attack role sorties, reconnaissance role sorties and
evacuation role sorties (used solely by Germans). The information on air sorties is given
in Table 14.
Days Soviet German
air-air grnd att. recon. air-air grnd att. recon. evac.
1 143 1 15 64 160
2 1051 600 14 371 1942 74 67
3 778 613 20 253 1356 77 138
4 899 661 14 297 1499 91 117
5 707 669 62 229 1426 82 129
6 490 472 65 248 1286 99 83
7 322 383 71 116 530 44 81
8 410 348 25 176 809 66 70
9 501 603 67 191 460 57 107
10 406 623 58 204 451 55 136
11 593 704 46 238 1147 88 135
12 182 369 48 132 541 37 116
13 454 681 33 145 278 82 95
14 268 336 17 40 122 33 71
15 239 377 13 40 18 41 68
TOTAL 7443 7440 568 2744 12025 926 1413
Table 14. Number o; : air sorties ' 'or Soviets and Germaris. Air-air (ienotes nuniber of air-
air role air sorties, grnd. att. denotes the number of ground attack role air sorties, recon.
denotes the number of reconnaissance role air sorties and evac. denotes the number
evacuation role air sorties. Evacuation role air sorties are used solely by Germans.
Figure 16 shows a comparison of the number of each type of air sorties for both
sides for the Battle of Kursk.
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air-air role ground attack role
Type of air sorties
reconnaissance role
Figure 17. Number of each type of air sorties for Germans and Soviets. When the
number of air-air role sorties are compared, the Soviets are superior to the Germans.
When the number of ground attack role sorties are compared, Germans are superior to
Soviets.
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IV. COMPARATIVE AND EXPLORATIVE ANALYSIS OF BATTLE OF
KURSK DATA
A. APPLICATION OF PREVIOUS STUDIES
1. Application of Bracken's methodology
This section analyzes the Battle of Kursk data following the same steps used by
Bracken in his study, and subsequently applies Bracken's models to the Battle of Kursk
data. The Battle of Kursk data is formatted and presented in tables using the same
methodology, explained in detail in Chapter 3 and formatting techniques as Bracken did
in his study. Tables 15 through 18 present data on combat manpower, APCs, tanks, and
artillery consecutively for days 1-15 of the Battle of Kursk, from June 4, 1943 to June 18,
1943, for both the German and the Soviet forces.
Day Blue manpower Blue casualties Red manpower Red casualties
1 510252 130 307365 800
2 507698 8527 301341 6192
3 498884 9423 297205 4302
4 489175 10431 293960 3414
5 481947 9547 306659 2942
6 470762 11836 303879 2953
7 460808 10770 302014 2040
8 453126 7754 300050 2475
9 433813 19422 298710 2612
10 423351 10522 299369 2051
11 415254 8723 297395 2140
12 419374 4076 296237 1322
13 416666 2940 296426 1350
14 415461 1217 296350 949
15 413298 3260 295750 1054
Table 15. Combat manpower data for both sides. Casualties are
captured/missing in action, and disease and nonbattle injuries. Notice




Day Blue APCs Blue APCs Killed Red APCs Red APCs killed
1 511 1170
2 507 4 1142 29
3 501 6 1128 14
4 490 11 1101 27
5 477 13 1085 16
6 458 19 1073 14
7 463 3 1114 42
8 462 4 1104 16
9 432 30 1099 12
10 424 8 1096 4
11 418 8 1093 6
12 417 1 1089 5
13 417 1092 1
14 417 2 1095 1
15 409 8 1098 5
Table 16. APC data for both sides. Killed are destroyed+abandoned and damaged.
Notice the high number of German APC losses on day 7 and the high number of Soviet
APC losses on day 9.
Day Blue Tanks Blue Tanks Killed Red Tanks Red Tanks killed
1 2500 1178 4
2 2396 105 986 198
3 2367 117 749 248
4 2064 259 673 121
5 1754 315 596 108
6 1495 289 490 139
7 1406 157 548 36
8 1351 135 563 63
9 977 414 500 98
10 978 117 495 57
11 907 118 480 46
12 883 96 426 79
13 985 27 495 23
14 978 42 557 7
15 948 85 588 6
Table 17. Tank data for both sides. Killed are destroyed+abandoned and damaged.
Notice the decrease in the number of tank losses after day 9. After day 9, the battle lost
its intensity.
Table 19 presents data on total forces, where the data from Tables 16-18 on
combat manpower, APCs, tanks, and artillery are weighted by 1, 5, 40, and 20,
respectively. Bracken [Ref.8] states in his study that, "The weights given above are
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Day Blue artillery Blue artillery killed Red artillery Red artillery killed
1 718 1189 1
2 705 13 1166 24
3 676 30 1161 5
4 661 15 1154 7
5 648 14 1213 13
6 640 9 1210 6
7 629 13 1199 12
8 628 7 1206 15
9 613 16 1194 12
10 606 10 1187 7
11 603 5 1184 5
12 601 5 1183 3
13 600 3 1179 4
14 602 1182 2
15 591 4 1182 11
Table 18. Aitillery data for both sides. Killed are destroyed+ab;indoned and damaged
On the initial days of the battle, German artillery losses were higher than the Soviet
artillery losses.
consistent with those of studies and models of the U.S. Army Concepts Analysis Agency.
Virtually all theater-level dynamic combat simulation models incorporate similar
weights, either as inputs or as decision parameters computed as the simulations progress".
Day Blue forces Blue losses Red forces Red losses
1 591527 130 384335 920
2 586353 11167 373411 11257
3 575769 12993 364265 9532
4 559345 16266 359085 6249
5 545332 16472 372524 5702
6 528552 18071 367444 6043
7 516403 14445 366504 3450
8 507576 10754 365070 4415
9 480033 28492 361965 5112
10 469271 13302 362229 3491
11 459604 11323 359820 3290




14 461186 2067 360245 1174
15 457943 5160 360280 1639
Table 19. Data on aggregated forces. Forces are combat manpower, APCs, tanks and
artillery which are weighted by 1,5, 20 and 40 respectively. The number of Soviet losses
on day 9 is almost three times the amount of Soviet loss on day 8.
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a. Estimation ofParameters
The parameters of the model are chosen to minimize the sum of squared
residuals between the estimated and actual attrition. Using 15 days of the Battle of Kursk












where n denotes the index for the 15 days of the battle. Using the data given in Table 17,
the above procedure will give a different SSR value for each set of parameters, i.e.
combination of a, b, p, q and d values. It will evaluate SS (ai,bj,pk ,ql ,dm ) for all
combinations of i, j, k, I and m where /=1,....,9, y=l,....,9, fc=l,....,21, /=1,....,21, and
m=l,....,9.
The range of possibilities allowed for the parameters, for the model with










(A. ,/>21 ) = (0.0, ,2.0),
(?,, ,4 21 ) = (0.0, ,2.0),
(<*„ ,</„) = (0.6, ,1.4).
These ranges were selected by Bracken himself.
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There are a total of 9x9x21x21x9 = 321489 combinations of the estimated
parameters. The algorithm searches all combinations and determines the parameters that
minimize the sum of squared residuals for the data given in Table 17 as:
SS(a9 ,b() ,p 2 ,q 2l ,d 4 ) = 8.65x10
s
with the estimated parameters of:
a9 = \.2x\0~\b6 = 9x\0~\p 2 = 0.l,q2l = 2.0,d4 =0.9.
Notice that the values of the a parameter and the q parameter are on the boundary.
Now, considering the estimation of parameters for the model without the
tactical parameter d, the ranges of possibilities allowed will be the same as those in the
previous procedure, except for the tactical parameter d. There are now a total of
9x9x21x21 = 35721 combinations of parameters. The algorithm searches all
combinations and determines the parameters that minimize the sum of squared residuals
for the data given in Table 17 as:
SS(a9 ,b6 ,p4 ,q ]9 ) = 8.88xl0
8





=9xl0"9 ,/? 2 =0.3,<? 21 =1.8.
Table 20 gives the sums of squared residuals for different values of d, and
shows which a, b, p, q combinations gives the minimum sums of squared residuals for the
various d values. Table 20 also shows the sensitivity of the p and q parameters to the d
parameter and suggests that the sums of the squared residuals are similar within a wide
range of parameter values.
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b. Results
The best fitting results for the two models for the Battle of Kursk data are:
Bracken's model 1 with tactical parameter d,
£ = 1.2xl0-8(— or—)R 0A B 20
9 10




d SSR a b P <l
0.5 1.38E+9 9.00E-9 6.00E-9 0.1 2.0
0.6 1.15E+9 1.00E-8 7.00E-9 0.1 2.0
0.7 9.84E+8 1.20E-8 8.00E-9 0.1 2.0
0.8 8.87E+8 1.20E-8 9.00E-9 0.1 2.0
0.9 8.65E+8 1.20E-8 9.00E-9 0.1 2.0
1.0 8.88E+8 1.20E-8 9.00E-9 0.3 1.8
1.1 9.34E+8 1.20E-8 8.00E-9 0.5 1.6
1.2 9.90E+8 1.20E-8 7.00E-9 0.7 1.4
1.3 1.05E+9 1.20E-8 7.00E-9 0.8 1.3
1.4 1.10E+9 1.20E-8 6.00E-9 1.0 1.1
1.5 1.16E+9 1.20E-8 5.00E-9 1.2 0.9
1.6 1.21E+9 1 .20E-8 5.00E-9 1.3 0.8
1.7 1.25E+9 1.20E-8 4.00E-9 1.5 0.6
Table 20. SSR values for different d values, a and b values are varied between 8x10 9
and 1.2xl0"8 with increments of lxlO-9
, p and q values are varied between 0.0 and 2.0
with increments of 0.1. The lowest SSR value is observed to be 8.65E+8 when d=0.9.
Bracken's model 3 without the tactical parameter d
B = \.2x\0's R03B]8
R = 9x\0-9 B03R LS
(8)
(9)
The parameters found in equations IV.A.l.b.(6), IV.A.l.b.(7),
IV.A.l.b.(8), IV.A.l.b.(9) suggest that one side's losses are more a function of his own
forces rather than a function of the opponent's forces. This result is similar to what
Fricker found in his study. There are boundaries set for the search of parameters that
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give the best fit. There may be other sets of parameters that are out of the range of
possibilities allowed by this method, and they may give a better fit for the data. The fact
that some of the best fitting parameters are on the boundary supports this hypothesis.
Figures 18 and 19 show the real and fitted values found using the model
with the d parameter (i.e., using equations IV.A.l.b.(6) and IV.A.l.b.(7), for the Soviet
and the German forces respectively). Figures 20 and 21 show the real and fitted values
found using the model without the d parameter (i.e. using the formulas IV.A.l.b.(8) and
IV.A.l.b.(9), for the Soviet and German forces, respectively).
When the plots given in Figures 18 and 20 are examined, there appears to be three
phases in the battle. It is also apparent that the battle lost its intensity after July 12. The
model underestimates the casualties for the beginning part and the last part of the battle
while overestimating the 8 days in a row between these two periods. This pattern
suggests that fitting a model with change points may improve the fit to the data.
For the model with the tactical parameter, p-q=-\.9, and for the model without the
tactical parameter p-q=-\.5. These two results imply that the Battle of Kursk data does
not fit any one of the basic Lanchester linear, square or logarithmic laws.
For both cases, parameters a and b are significantly small and a > b. This
suggests that individual German effectiveness was greater than individual Russian
effectiveness.
For the purpose of comparing a variety of models throughout this thesis, R 2
values are also computed together with the SSR for each model, where R 2 is given as:
49
















O 'O O- Real Soviet Losses













1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
Days
Figure 18. Fitted Soviet losses found by using Bracken's model with parameter d, plotted
versus real Soviet losses. Notice the three-phase pattern in the model's fit to the battle
data where the model overestimates the first two days and the last four days of the battle
while underestimating the part between these two phases.
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Figure 19. Fitted German losses found by using Bracken's model with parameter d,
plotted versus real German losses. After the Soviets went into offense, the battle was not
as intense.
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Figure 20. Fitted Soviet losses found by using Bracken's model without parameter d,
plotted versus real Soviet losses. Like the plot given in Figure 18, notice the three-phase
pattern in the model's fit to the battle where the model overestimates the first two days
and the last four days of the battle while underestimating the part between these two
phases.
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Figure 21. Fitted German losses found by using Bracken's model without parameter d,






where Y , Y and Y denote the estimated value, the real value and the mean value of the Y
parameter (daily casualties) which are indexed by days. A greater R 2 value indicates a
better fit. It is possible to get a negative R 2 value, implying that the fitted model yields
worse results than using the average daily losses as an estimate.




















1.2E-8 9.0E-9 0.3 1.8 1.0 8.88E+8 -0.0266
Table 21. Bracken's results for his models with the tactical parameter d for both the
Ardennes and Kursk data.
Upon examination of the fits of Bracken's models found in this section, it is clear
that the battle did not start until the second day. Thus, the first day of data was dropped
in fitting the data to the models in the rest of the thesis. More detailed explanation on this
approach is given in Section IV.B.l.
Bracken's Model 1 was refit using only the last 14 days of the data. The new
parameter estimates are: a=1.2xl0~8
, fc=1.0xl0~8
,
p=0,l, q=2.0, d=1.0. The SSR value
dropped to 6.50xl08 and the R 2 value increased to 0.0919.
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2. Application of Fricker's methodology
In his study, Fricker presents an alternate way to structure the data that reflects the
effects of both previous casualties and incremental reinforcements. His idea is based on
the fact that the casualties occur according to the Lanchester equations that use the
previous day's force size, and for any given day, the previous day's force size also
depends on the transfer of troops in or out of the fighting force.
Because of this phenomenon, Fricker uses the following algorithm in his study to
estimate the original total for each resource. The algorithm works sequentially stepping
through the whole battle from day 1 to the last day of the battle. By using this algorithm,
local reserves (X
/r
)or the addition of reinforcements (X
r
) are accounted for. The
algorithm first uses local reserves for any force increase before using reinforcements. As














(t) + [X(t + l)-X(t) + X(t)]
Else, if X(t + l)>X(t)-X(t) and X
lr





(t)-[X(t + \)-X(t) + X(t)]
Else, if X (t + 1) > X (?) - X (?) and
< X
lr
















(t) + [X(t)-X(t)-X(t + \)]
3. If t < 3 1, increment t and go to step #2; else X(0) = X(0) + X
r
(t)
Then the new daily resources X (t + 1) are calculated as:
X(t + \) = X(t)-X(t) t = 0, ,31 (11)
After the data is reformatted using the algorithm given above, Fricker applies
linear regression to logarithmically transformed Lanchester equations for estimating the
model parameters. After the logarithmic transformation, the basic Lanchester equations,
given in I.B.(l) and I.B.(2), will look like:
\n(B) = \n(a)+p\n(R) + q\n(B) (12)
In (R) = \n (b) + p In (B) + q In (R) (13)
Below is the Battle of Kursk data reformatted using Fricker' s approach. For
reformatting the data, the algorithm, which is explained in detail above, is applied to the
given Battle of Kursk data.
Tables 22 and 23 present the raw manpower and weapon systems data,
respectively. Tables 24 and 25 present the resulting reformatted Kursk data for
manpower and weapon systems, respectively. Table 26 presents the aggregated force
(except the first day) found by aggregating the data given in Tables 24 and 25.
The air sortie data given in the KOSAVE study [Ref.12] consists of the number of
air-air role sorties, ground attack role sorties, reconnaissance role sorties and evacuation
role sorties (solely used by Germans). Table 27 presents data on number of ground attack
role sorties. Table 28 presents the aggregated force, after the air sortie data is added
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(except the first day) by using the weight coefficient of 30, as used by Fricker, (i.e., the
number of air sorties presented in Table 27 is multiplied by 30 and added to the
aggregated force levels given in Table 26 to get the data presented in Table 28).
Day Blue Available Blue Killed Red Available Red Killed
1 510252 130 307365 800
2 507698 8527 301341 6192
3 498884 9423 297205 4302
4 489175 10431 293960 3414
5 481947 9547 306659 2942
6 470762 11836 303879 2953
7 460808 10770 302014 2040
8 453126 7754 300050 2475
9 433813 19422 298710 2612
10 423351 10522 299369 2051
11 415254 8723 297395 2140
12 419374 4076 296237 1322
13 416666 2940 296426 1350
14 415461 .1217 296350 949
15 413298 3260 295750 1054
Table 22. Battle of Kursk manpower data for the Soviet and German forces.
Day
BLUE RED
Available Killed Available Killed
Tank APC Art. Tank APC Art. Tank APC Art. Tank APC Art.
1 2500 511 718 1178 1170 1189 4 1
2 2396 507 705 105 4 13 986 1142 1166 198 29 24
3 2367 501 676 117 6 30 749 1128 1161 248 14 5
4 2064 490 661 259 11 15 673 1101 1154 121 27 7
5 1754 477 648 315 13 14 596 1085 1213 108 16 13
6 1495 458 640 289 19 9 490 1073 1210 139 14 6
7 1406 463 629 157 3 13 548 1114 1199 36 42 12
8 1351 462 628 135 4 7 563 1104 1206 63 16 15
9 977 432 613 414 30 16 500 1099 1194 98 12 12
10 978 424 606 117 8 10 495 1096 1187 57 4 7
11 907 418 603 118 8 5 480 1093 1184 46 6 5
12 883 417 601 96 1 5 426 1089 1183 79 5 3
13 985 417 600 27 3 495 1092 1179 23 1 4
14 978 417 602 42 2 557 1095 1182 7 1 2
15 948 409 591 85 8 4 588 1098 1182 6 5 11
Table 23. Battle of Kursk data for tanks, APCs, and artillery of the Soviet and German
forces.
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Day Blue Available Blue Killed Red Available Red Killed
1 529562 130 331292 800
? 529432 8527 330492 6192
3 520905 9423 324300 4302
4 511482 10431 319998 3414
5 501051 9547 316584 2942
6 491504 11836 313642 2953
7 479668 10770 310689 2040
8 468898 7754 308649 2475
9 461144 19422 306174 2612
10 441722 10522 303562 2051
11 431200 8723 301511 2140
12 422477 4076 299371 1322
13 418401 2940 298049 1350
14 415461 1217 296699 949
15 414244 3260 295750 1054
Table 24.
forces.
The reformatted Battle of Kursk manpower data for the Soviet and German
Day
BLUE RED
Available Killed Available Killed
Tank APC Art. Tank APC Art. Tank APC Art. Tank APC Art.
1 3139 524 742 1815 1285 1298 4 1
2 3139 524 742 105 4 13 1811 1285 1297 198 29 24
3 3034 520 729 117 6 30 1613 1256 1273 248 14 5
4 2917 514 699 259 11 15 1365 1242 1268 121 27 7
5 2658 503 684 315 13 14 1244 1215 1261 108 16 13
6 2343 490 670 289 19 9 1136 1199 1248 139 14 6
7 2054 471 661 157 3 13 997 1185 1242 36 42 12
8 1897 468 648 135 4 7 961 1143 1230 63 16 15
9 1762 464 641 414 30 16 898 1127 1215 98 12 12
10 1348 434 625 117 8 10 800 1115 1203 57 4 7
11 1231 426 615 118 8 5 743 1111 1196 46 6 5
12 1113 418 610 96 1 5 697 1105 1191 79 5 3
13 1017 417 605 27 3 618 1100 1188 23 1 4
14 990 417 602 42 2 595 1099 1184 7 1 2
15 948 415 602 85 8 4 588 1098 1182 6 5 11
Table 25. The reformatted Battle of Kursk equipment data for tanks, APCs, and artillery
of the Soviet and German forces.
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Day Blue forces Blue losses Red forces Red losses
1 624512 11167 425017 11257
7 613345 12993 413760 9532
3 600352 16266 404228 6249
4 584086 16472 397979 5702
5 567614 18071 392277 6043
6 549543 14445 386234 3450
7 535098 10754 382784 4415
8 524344 28492 378369 5112
9 495852 13302 373257 3491
10 482550 11323 369766 3290
11 471227 6201 366476 3047
12 465026 3600 363429 1975
13 461426 2067 361454 1174
14 459359 5160 360280 1639
Table 26. Data on aggregated forces that are reformatted without air sorties. Forces are
combat manpower, APCs, Tanks and artillery weighted by 1,5, 20 and 40, respectively.
















Table 27. Data on number of ground attack role air sorties for German and Soviet forces.
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Day Blue forces Blue losses Red forces Red losses
1 642512 11167 483277 11257
2 631735 12993 454440 9532
3 620182 16266 449198 6249
4 604156 16472 440759 5702
5 581774 18071 430857 6043
6 561033 14445 402134 3450
7 545538 10754 407054 4415
8 542434 28492 392169 5112
9 514542 13302 386787 3491
10 503670 11323 404176 3290
11 482297 6201 382706 3047
12 485456 3600 371769 1975
13 471506 2067 365114 1174
14 470669 5160 360820 1639
Table 28. Data on aggregated forces reformatted with
manpower, APCs, tanks, artillery and number of ground
weighted by 1,5, 20,40 and 30, respectively.
air sorties. Forces are combat
attack role air sorties which are
a. Estimation ofParameters
After reformatting the data, linear regression is applied to logarithmically
transformed Lanchester equations to estimate the model parameters which are given in
equations IV.A.2.(12) and IV.A.2.(13).
To estimate the parameters of the model, which minimize the sum of
squared residuals, 14 days of data given in Table 24, Table 26 and S-PLUS Software are
used.
b. Results
Results for the models are:
Fricker's model for the Kursk data without the air sorties, with tactical
parameter d, with an SSR value of 5.94xl08 and an R 2 value of 0.1703 is:
£ = 3.77xl0"33(— or IjiT'B""
79 100
(14)




Fricker's model for the Kursk data without the air sorties, and without the
tactical parameter d, with an SSR value of 6.69 x 108 and an R 2 value of 0.0657 is:
B = 1.19xl0-32 /?36736526934 (16)
/? = 3.44xl0-"5 36736 /? 26934 (17)
It is significant that the resulting parameters are sensitive to the d
parameter; after adding the d parameter, the p and q parameters change dramatically.
The above parameters are the ones that give the smallest SSR value. It is
possible to have smaller SSR values for the model with the tactical parameter d if the
parameter /? or q is allowed to have negative values. In staying consistent with Fricker's
approach, negative exponent parameters are not considered in this section. Negative
values are looked at in the conclusion section.
Fricker's model for the Kursk data with the air sorties, with tactical
parameter d, with an SSR value of 6.24xl08 and an R 2 value of 0.1285 is:
B = 3.35xlO" 27(— or *L)R°»™B 52207 (18)
93 100
R = 5.76xl0~27(— or i^)5 00955 /? 52207 (19)
100 93
Fricker's model for the Kursk data with the air sorties, and without the
tactical parameter d, with an SSR value of 7. 18x 108 and an R 2 value of -0.020 is:
5 = 5.01xl0-27 ^ 14983538 ' 79 (20)
^ = 3.85xlO- 27 /? ,4983B38179 (21)
Like the models without the air sorties added, the above parameters are the
ones that give the smallest SSR value. It is possible to have smaller SSR values for the
model with the tactical parameter d if the parameter p or q is allowed to have negative
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values. That is the algorithm of a force's casualties decreases as one of the force
strengths increases, and since this interpretation does not make sense, the negative values
are not considered.
Figures 22 and 23 show the fitted losses plotted versus real losses for the
Soviet and the German forces, respectively, for Fricker's model without the air sortie data
added and using the d parameter.
Figures 24 and 25 show fitted losses plotted versus real losses for the
Soviet and the German forces, respectively, for Fricker's model without the air sortie data
added and without using the d parameter.
Figures 26 and 27 show the fitted losses plotted versus real losses for the
.
Soviet and the German forces, respectively, for Fricker's model with the air sortie data
added and using the d parameter.
Figures 28 and 29 show the fitted losses plotted versus real losses for the
Soviet and the German forces, respectively, for Fricker's model with the air sortie data
added and without using the d parameter.
When theR 2 values above, which are found by using Fricker's methodology, are
compared, it is seen that adding the air sortie data improves the fit for the Battle of Kursk
data. Using the tactical parameter does not improve the fit to the Battle of Kursk data for
the model without the air sorties. On the contrary, using the tactical parameter improves
the fit to the Battle of Kursk data for the model with the air sorties.
The d parameter is found to be 0.79 and 0.93 for the models without the air sorties
and with the air sorties, consecutively. This result implies a defender advantage/attacker
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Figure 22. Fitted losses plotted versus real losses for the Soviet forces for Fricker's model
without the air sortie data added and using the d parameter. Notice the pattern where the
model overestimates the initial and the last part of the battle, while underestimating the
part in between.
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Figure 23. Fitted losses plotted versus real forces for the German forces for Fricker's
model without the air sortie data added and using the d parameter.
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Figure 24. Fitted losses plotted versus real Soviet losses for the Soviet forces for
Fricker's model without the air sortie data added and without using the d parameter. The
same pattern in which the model over/underestimates the battle in three distinctive phases
is also observable in this plot.
Fitted vs. Real German Losses for Fricker's model without
sortie without d
Real German Losses
M Fitted German Losses
10 11 12 13 14
Figure 25. Fitted losses plotted versus real Geman losses for the German forces for
Fricker's model without the air sortie data added and without using the d parameter.
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Fitted vs. Real Soviet Losses for Fricker's model with air
sortie and with d
O- Real Soviet Losses
-
— Fitted Soviet Losses
Figure 26. Fitted losses plotted versus real losses for Soviet forces for Fricker's model
with the air sortie data added and using the d parameter.
Fitted vs. Real German Losses for Fricker's model with
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Figure 27. Fitted losses plotted versus real losses for German forces for Fricker's model
with the air sortie data added and using the d parameter.
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Fitted vs. Real Soviet Losses for Fricker's model with air
sortie and without d
Real Soviet Losses
-
— Fitted Soviet Losses
Figure 28. Fitted losses plotted versus real losses for the Soviet forces for Fricker's model
with the air sortie data added and without using the d parameter.
Fitted vs. Real German Losses for Fricker's model with air










— Fitted German Losses
Figure 29. Fitted losses plotted versus real losses for the German forces for Fricker's
model with the air sortie data added and without using the d parameter.
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disadvantage. In both cases, when the tactical parameter is used, a<b, and when tactical
parameter is not used, a>b. Again, in both cases, the a and b parameters are very small.
When the plots given in Figures 22, 24, 26 and 28 are examined, there appears to
be three phases in the battle. It is also apparent that the battle lost its intensity after July
12. Notice the pattern where the model overestimates the beginning part and the last part
of the battle while underestimating the 8 days in a row between these two parts. This
pattern suggests that fitting a model with change points may improve the model's fit to
the data. Also, the model provides a much better fit for the German side.
In equations IV.A.2.b.(14), IV.A.2.b.(15), IV.A.2.b.(18), IV.A.2.b.(19) and
IV.A.2.b.(20), IV.A.2.b.(21) the q parameter is greater than the p parameter suggesting
that one side's loss is more a function of his own forces rather than his opponent's forces.
This finding is similar to what Fricker observed in his study.
In equations IV.A.2.b.(16), IV.A.2.b.(17) the p parameter is greater than the q
parameter, which suggest that one side's loss is more a function of his opponent's forces
rather than his own forces. This finding is different from Fricker's findings.
It is significant that using the tactical parameter d does not improve the fit for the
model without the air sortie data when SSR values are compared. This may be
interpreted as using the logarithmically transformed equations does not necessarily gives
the best fit in the original form. Table 29 shows the results for Fricker's models as a
whole for both the Ardennes and the Kursk data. The negative R 2 values found here
imply that the fitted model yields worse results than using the average daily losses as an
estimate. This finding was communicated with Fricker and it was concluded that the
reason for the negative R 2 values are the combination of extreme sensitivity of the
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results to the precision of parameters and using the rounded off values given in Fricker's
study [Ref.6]. For example, for the first model given in Table 29, changing the q
parameter from 5.0 to 5.02 increases the R 2 value from -0.7938 to 0.1904, and changing






























5.01E-27 3.85E-27 1.4983 3.8179 - 7.16E+8 -0.0222
Table 29. Fricker's results for his models with/without the tactical parameter d,
with/without the air sortie added, for both the Ardennes and the Kursk data.
B. EXPLORATORY ANALYSIS OF BATTLE OF KURSK DATA
The fighting on the first day of the battle was sporadic. The extremely low
casualty levels represent large outliers; this, including the data of the first day could
drastically effect the outcome of the analysis. Thus, the first day of data was dropped in
fitting the data to the models. This kind of approach is also supported by the historical
account of the Battle of Kursk, because the main offensive did not really begin until July
5, the second day of the battle. Even if there are other days on which large outliers are
observed—like July 12—these outliers will not be left out of the analysis as they are a
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result of the fighting during the Kursk offensive. Therefore, this study will fit only the
last 14 days of the aggregated data given in Table 14, excluding the first day. All the
results found from the models are summarized as a whole in Table 42 in Section IV.B.10.
1. The scalar aggregation models
Two numerical methods are used to fit parameters to the scalar model of
Lanchester equations. One is linear regression and the other is robust LTS regression.
Robust LTS regression method performs least-trimmed squares regression [Ref.17].
When the given data in hand contains significant outliers as in our case, robust regression
models are useful for fitting linear relationships by discounting outlying data. Both
methods minimize the sum of squared residual (SSR) error resulting from the model to
the actual data.
a. Linear regression
Linear regression is used for fitting parameters to the logarithmically
transformed Lanchester equations. The original form of Lanchester equations are given
in equations I.A.(l) and LA. (2). By taking the logarithm of each side of the equations,
we get:
log (B) = log(fl) + p logOR) + q log(fl) (22)
log (R) = logOO + p log(5) + q log(fl) (23)
Only the last 14 days of the data given in Table 19 are used for performing
the linear regression analysis.
b. Results ofthe linear regression model
Results of the linear regression model which gives an SSR value of
6.36x1 8 and an R 2 value of 0. 1 1 26 are:
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B = 1.06xl0-47 /?574755 33356 (24)
/^l.QOxlO^fl57475 ;?33356 (25)
c. Robust LTS regression
We will use Robust LTS regression for fitting parameters to the
Lanchester equations. The original form of Lanchester equations are given in equations
I.A.(l) and I.A. (2). By taking the log of each side of the equations, we obtain the
equations given in IV.A.2.(22) and IV.A.2(23). Only the last 14 days of the data given in
Table 19 are used for doing the robust LTS regression analysis.
d. Results ofthe robust LTS regression
Results for the robust LTS regression model which gives an SSR value of
5.54 x 10
8
and an R 2 value of 0.2262 are:




Figures 30 and 3 1 show fitted losses plotted versus real losses for the Soviet and
the German forces, respectively, for the linear regression model. Figures 31 and 32 show
fitted losses plotted versus real losses for the Soviet and the German forces, respectively,
for the robust LTS regression model.
When the SSR values found by using linear regression and robust LTS regression
techniques are compared, it is observed that using the robust LTS regression technique
improves the fit for the Battle of Kursk data. The SSR value, which is found by using the
robust LTS regression method, is the smallest for the Kursk data so far.
It should be noted that even if the robust LTS regression technique accounts for
the outliers when finding the parameters that minimize the SSR for a given model, the
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SSR values computed here include the SSR of the outliers. In other words, when the
parameters computed by the robust LTS regression technique are used in the analysis, the
Fitted vs. Real Soviet Losses for the Linear Regression model
Real Soviet Losses
-
— Fitted Soviet Losses
10 11 12 13 14
Figure 30. Fitted losses plotted versus real losses for Soviet forces for the linear
regression model. The significant outlier on day 8 influences the fit dramatically.
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Figure 3 1 . Fitted losses plotted versus real losses for German forces for the robust LTS
regression model. The data for the German side, with no significant outliers, gives a
better fit for the model.
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Figure 32 Fitted losses plotted versus real losses for Soviet forces for the robust LTS
model. The significant outlier on day 8 influences the fit dramatically.
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Figure 33. Fitted losses plotted versus real losses for the German forces for the robust
LTS regression model. The data for the German side, with no significant outliers, gives a
better fit for the model.
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outliers are not discounted. They are included for the purpose of computing the SSR
value.
When the p and q parameters are compared it is noticed that the p parameter is
greater than the q parameter, suggesting that one side's loss is more a function of his
opponent's forces rather than his own forces. This interpretation is different from what
Fricker found in his study. In both cases, a and b parameters are significantly small, and
a >b.
When the plots given in Figures 30 and 32 are examined, there appears to be three
distinct phases in the battle. It is also apparent that the battle lost its intensity after July
12. After the Soviets went into offense, the battle was not as intense. There is a clear
pattern in Figure 30 where the model overestimates the beginning part and the last part of
the battle, while underestimating the attrition for eight days in a row between these two
periods.
The pattern seen in Figures 30 and 32 suggests that fitting a model with change
points may improve the model's fit to the data. Likewise, leaving out the data given for
July 12 when the most intense fighting of the battle took place, it may also be possible to
increase the fit to the data, an approach which will be covered in upcoming sections.
Also, the model provides a much better fit for the German side.
2. Including air sortie data
As mentioned in IV.A. 2, the air sortie data given in the KOSAVE study [Ref.12]
consists of the numbei of air-air role sorties, ground attack role sorties, reconnaissance
role sorties and evacuation role sorties (which are solely used by Germans). For
aggregating the air sortie data into total aggregated number of forces, we will use the data
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given in Table 27 that presents data on the number of ground attack role sorties.
However, the aggregated data will be different than that given in Table 28, because the
data in Table 28 is calculated using the reformatted data by applying Fricker's algorithm.
The data, which we will be using in this section, is given in Table 30 which
presents the total number of aggregated forces, including the air data by weighing each
sortie by 30. In other words, the number of air sorties presented in Table 27 is multiplied
by 30 and added onto the aggregated force levels given in Table 19 in order to compute
the data presented in Table 30.
Two regression methods, presented in IV.B.l are used for fitting the data given in
Table 30, namely, linear regression and robust LTS regression.
day Blue Forces Blue Losses Red Forces Red Losses
1 604353 11167 431671 11257
2 594159 12993 404945 9532
3 579175 16266 404055 6249
4 565402 16472 415304 5702
5 542712 18071 406024 6043
6 527893 14445 382404 3450
7 518016 10754 389340 4415
8 498123 28492 375765 5112
9 487961 13302 375759 3491
10 480724 11323 394230 3290
11 474229 6201 373752 3047
12 482881 3600 367286 1975
13 471266 2067 363905 1174
14 469253 5160 360820 1639
Table 30. Data on aggregated forces. Forces are combat manpower, APCs




20, 40 and 30,
a. Results oflinear regression model
Results for the linear regression model, which gives an SSR value of
6.85xl08 and an /lvalue of 0.0433, are:
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B = 1.40xlO-35 /?51323fi17793 (28)
R = 2.09xlO_36£51323 /? 17793 (29)
b. Results of robust LTS regression model
Results for the robust LTS regression model, which gives an SSR value of
7.58xl08 and an R 2 value of -0.0579, are:
B = 1.21xl0~38# 536915 20883 (30)
/? = 1.75xl0-39 553691 /? 20883 (31)
Figures 34 and 35 show the fitted losses plotted versus real losses for the Soviet
and the German forces respectively, for the linear regression model with the air sortie
data added.
Figures 36 and 37 show the fitted losses plotted versus real losses for the Soviet
and the German forces respectively, for the robust LTS regression model with the air
sortie data added.
Following the aggregation of the data using the number of air sorties, it is not
appropriate to compare the models using the SSR values because, the increase in the SSR
value may be a natural result of adding the air sortie data. For this reason, R 2 values will
be used to compare the fit of the model.
Upon the examination of the R 2 values above, which are found by applying linear
regression and robust LTS regression techniques to the logarithmically transformed data
that includes air sorties, one can determine that considering the air sorties data does not
improve the model's fit to the data. The R 2 values, which are found by using the linear
regression and the robust LTS regression technique, are both lower than the R 2 values
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Fitted vs. Real Soviet Losses for the Linear Regression
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Figure 34. Fitted losses plotted versus real losses for Soviet forces for the linear
regression model with the air sortie data added. The significant outlier on day 8
influences the fit dramatically. The same pattern where the model over/underestimates
the battle in three distinctive phases is observable in this plot too.
Fitted vs. Real German Losses for the Linear Regression
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Figure 35. Fitted losses plotted versus real losses for German forces for the linear
regression model with the air sortie data added. The data for the German side, with no
significant outliers, gives a better fit for the model.
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Fitted vs. Real Soviet Losses for the Robust LTS









Figure 36. Fitted losses plotted versus real losses for the Soviet forces for the robust LTS
regression model with the air sortie data added. The significant outlier on day 8
influences the fit dramatically. The same pattern where the model over/underestimates
the battle in three distinctive phases is observable in this plot too.
Fitted vs. Real German Losses for the Robust LTS
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Figure 37. Fitted losses plotted versus real losses for the German forces for the robust
LTS regression model with the air sortie data added The data for the German side, with
no significant outliers, gives a better fit for the model.
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found in Section IV.B.l which did not include the air sortie data. While the previous best
fit found was 0.2262 in section IV.B.l.d, after the air sortie data is added, R 2 is found to
be 0.0433 and -0.0579. Adding air sortie data did not improve model's fit to the data.
For both cases, the a and b parameters are significantly small and a > b. This
suggests that individual German effectiveness was greater than individual Russian
effectiveness.
When the p and q parameters are compared it is observed that the p parameter is
greater than the q parameter, indicating that one side's losses are more a function of his
opponent's forces rather than being a function of his own forces. This result is different
from what Fricker found in his study.
When the plots given in Figures 34 and 36 are examined, the resulting pattern is
similar to the one seen in the previous section. This pattern again suggests that fitting a
model with change points may improve the model's fit to the data. Again, similar to the
previous results, it may be possible to increase the fit to the data by leaving out the data
given for July 12.
3. Taking into account the change in offensive/defensive roles
By historical account, the German forces generally maintained an offensive
posture (this is not valid for all units on the battlefield) through July 12, when the Soviets
were able to gain the initiative and launch their counter-offensive. Bracken [Ref.13]
introduced an additional parameter d to the standard Lanchester equations (I.B.(l) and
LB. (2)), called a tactical parameter, to account for a battle in which defense and offense
switch during the course of the campaign.
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With d for the defender and (1/d) for the attacker, the Lanchester equations are
modified to accept the tactical parameter d and are given as:
B=(dorl/d)aR pB q (32)
R=(l/dord)bB pR q (33)
The logarithmically transformed Lanchester equations which are modified to
accept the tactical parameter (for the days that red is the attacker), are given as:
\og{Bld) = log(fl) + p\o°(R) + q\og{B) (34)
\og(RI(\l d)) = \og{b) + p\og{B) + q\og{R) (35)
Linear regression and robust LTS regression models are used to estimate the
model parameters represented above in IV.B.3.(34) and IV.B. 3.(35).
a. Linear regression
The last 14 days of the aggregated data given in Table 14 in section
IV.A. 1 and the S-PLUS software are used to estimate the model's parameters, which
minimize the sum of squared residuals of the actual and estimated attrition.
In order to iterate for different d values, linear regression is fit for multiple
d values, and then the d value that gives the minimum SSR is selected. The value of
tactical parameter d is varied between 0.0 and 9.0 in increments of 0.01.
b. Results ofthe linear regression model
Results for the linear regression model which gives an SSR value of
6.24 xlO8 and a tactical parameter value of 1.17 and an/? 2 value of 0.1295 are:
B =(— or 1.17)1.88xl0^7 /?75038S 15793 (36)
1.17
1
. „^8 D7.5038r>1.5793R =(1.17 or -^)l.07xl0-*8£ /^u-,s/^ :,/ -'-, (37)
1.17
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c. Robust LTS regression
For estimating the parameters, which minimize the sum of squared
residuals of the actual and estimated attirition, the last 14 days of the aggregated data
given in Table 5, in Section IV.A. 1 and the S-PLUS software are used.
d. Results of the robust LTS regression
Results for the robust LTS regression model which gives an SSR value of
5.54 x 108 and a tactical parameter value of 1 .00 and an R 2 value of 0.2262 are:
B = (— or l.O^^TxlO-40 /?60843^ 73 ' 2 (38)
1.0
R = (1.0 or —)1.84xl0" 41 /?608435,73P- (39)
1.0
Figures 38 and 39 shows the fitted losses plotted versus real losses of the Soviet
and the German forces, respectively, for the linear regression model.
Figures 40 and 41 shows the fitted losses plotted versus real losses of the Soviet
and the German forces, respectively, for the robust LTS regression model.
When the SSR values above are examined, it is apparent that taking into
consideration the change in offensive/defensive roles improves the fit. The SSR values,
which are found by using the linear regression and robust LTS regression technique, are
both less than or equal to the SSR values found in section IV.B.l, which did not consider
the change in offensive/defensive roles. The best fit found in section IV.B.l was
6.36 xlO8 for the linear regression model, after the d parameter is included in the model,
SSR value is found to be 6.24xl08
, suggesting only a 2% improvement in fit. But, this
is not the case for robust LTS regression model. While the previous result for robust LTS
regression model was found to be 5.54x10s in Section IV.B.l. d, after the change in
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Figure 38. Fitted losses plotted versus real losses for the Soviet forces for the linear
regression model with the tactical parameter d. The significant outlier on day 8 influences
the fit dramatically.


















1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
Days
Figure 39. Fitted losses plotted versus real losses for the German forces for the linear
regression model with the tactical parameter d. The data for the German side, with no
significant outliers gives a better fit for the model.
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Figure 40. Fitted losses plotted versus Real losses for the Soviet forces for the robust LTS
model with the tactical parameter d.
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Figure 41. Fitted losses plotted versus Real losses for the German forces for the robust
LTS model with the tactical parameter d.
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offensive/defensive roles is taken into account, it is again found to be5.54x 108 . In other
words, taking into account the change in offensive/defensive roles does not change the fit
for the robust LTS regression model.
Following a search of the tactical parameter d value, performed in increments of
0.01, 1.0 is found to be the optimal d value that gives the smallest SSR value for the
robust LTS regression model. This result indicates that in the context of the Battle of
Kursk, one side's status as the defender or attacker does not affect the number of losses
which either of the sides is going to suffer. This reasoning may not intuitively make
sense, but further analysis made in the following sections will provide additional
rationale.
For both cases, the a and b parameters are significantly small, and a>b. This
suggests that individual German effectiveness is greater than individual Russian
effectiveness.
The d parameter with a value of 1.17 signifies that the attacker has an advantage.
This result is somewhat unexpected and implies that it is the attacker who will suffer
fewer casualties. (The d parameter is investigated more closely in upcoming sections).
When p and q parameters are compared, it is observed that the p parameter is
greater than the q parameter, suggesting that one side's losses are more a function of the
opponent's forces rather than a function of its own forces. This finding is different from
what Fricker found in his study.
When the plots given in Figures 38 through 41 are examined, the pattern seen in
these plots are similar to the results observed in the previous section. This pattern, again,
suggests that fitting a model with change points may improve the fit and again the models
fit better for the Germans.
4. Considering the tactical parameter d of the campaign
The findings in the previous sections suggest that fitting models with different d
values for separate phases of the battle might improve the fit to the data and this section
focuses on that aspect of our findings and will analyze the battle in separate time periods.
The tactical parameter found in the previous section, d=\.ll, is similar to
Bracken's [Ref.8] findings which also implied an attacker advantage. Since d>\,
implying that if Blue is defending, then blue has a defender disadvantage, and if red is
attacking when d>\, then red has an attacker advantage. This intuitively does not make
much sense because the defender is usually dug in, and the attacker is out in the open and
easily detected by the enemy. It should be the defender who has the advantage rather
than the attacker when attrition rates are considered. In this situation, it may not make
sense to have only one d for the whole campaign.
A closer look at the battle data may find a better fit for the model. The very first
day of the battle, the Germans run into the heavily fortified Soviet positions and
minefields and have a very rough day. This first day, the Germans obviously have an
attacker disadvantage, while the Russians have a defender advantage. July 6, 1943 is the
day when things begin to run smoothly for the Germans, as they are not up against a
fortified defense, dense barriers and minefields. This scenario continues until July 12,
when the Soviets launch their counter-attack. Even on that day, the Germans were not
aware of the Soviets' intention to make such a move [Ref.16]. July 12, 1943 can be
viewed as the day, when neither side was a defender. Both sides attacked each other
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resulting in the bloodiest day of the campaign. The Soviets especially suffered heavy
casualties. From July 13 on, the Soviets continued their counter-attacks until they
recaptured the ground they had lost. During this time Germans use a hasty defense.
This type of approach is also justified by the historical account of the battle,
which is explained in detail in [Ref.15] and [Ref.16]. As a result of the clearly defined
phases of the battle, the data will be handled in four different time periods. A different d
value will be used for each part of the campaign (i.e. there will be four different d
parameters for the campaign). A weakness of this approach is the fact that it requires
fitting 8 parameters with 14 days of data.
• First period July 5: Germans attack heavily fortified Soviet positions.
• Second period July 6-July 1 1 : Germans continue a more organized attack.
• Third period July 12: Soviets counterattack when Germans were
continuing their attack.
• Fourth period July 13-July 18: Soviets attack and Germans make a hasty
defense).
A different d parameter is fit to each of the four parts of the campaign using the
same a, b, p, q parameters shown in equations IV.B.3.b.(34) and IV.B.3.b.(35) for the
data in Table 19. This will be referred to as Model 1 for this section. The results are as
follows.
The first period had the smallest SSR value when J=0.91. The second period had
the smallest SSR value when d=\.24. The third period is considered to have the tactical
parameter d=\ because there was no defender during the third period. The fourth period
had the smallest SSR value when d=l.ll.
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The interpretation of the d values found is that the d value of 0.91 for the first
period (i.e. the defender having the advantage), definitely makes sense because the
Germans were attacking against the heavily fortified Soviet positions, and as a result, the
Soviets inflicted heavier casualties on the Germans than the Germans did on the Soviets.
By intuition, it is likely that Soviets will continue to have the defender advantage
through the second period as well. But this is not the case, since d=l.24, meaning that
even if it were the Germans attacking they were more advantageous than the Soviets who
were in their defensive postures. That is, it was the Soviets who were losing more.
The third period is considered to be the day that neither side is defending, so no
interpretation is needed.
The fourth period has a d value of 1.17, which again indicates an attacker
advantage. The value 1.17 indicates a slightly smaller attacker advantage than the
Germans had during the second period. The Soviets had an attacker advantage during the
fourth period, but not one so great as the Germans had during the second period.









respectively. The overall sum of the SSR
values is 5.34xl0 8 for the whole campaign, which gives a 4% better fit than the previous
results. Figures 42 and 43 show the fitted versus real losses for the Soviet and German
forces, respectively, for Model 1
.
Overall, these results interpreted above indicate that for the Battle of Kursk, other
than on the first day, it was always advantageous to be the attacker.
84



















1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13
Days
14
Figure 42. Fitted losses plotted versus real losses for the Soviet forces for model 1, which
has four periods, and d=\ for the 8 th day of the battle.
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Figure 43. Fitted losses plotted versus real losses for the German forces for model 1,
which has four periods, and d=\ for the 8 th day of the battle.
85
One could argue that the third period, having no tactical parameter, does not make
sense. If the third period is considered to have a tactical parameter of its own that is
independent from the others, assuming that it was the day on which Soviets attacked, it is
found to be d=032. This result obviously indicates an absolute defender advantage for
the Germans and attacker disadvantage for the Russians. This will be referred as Model 2
for this section. In such an approach, the SSR value for the third period will be 1.78xl07
giving an overall SSR value of 1.69xl08— almost a 70% better fit than the result found
for Model 1 above. This is a much better fit because the biggest outlier now has its own
unique d parameter, and is essentialy removed. This is also a clear indication of the
tremendous effect of one outlier on the fit of the models. Figures 44 and 45 show the
fitted versus real losses for the Soviet and German forces, respectively for Model 2.
Based on the results above, it can be concluded that considering the campaign in
four different parts definitely helps to find a better fit. So, for combat modeling purposes,
the tactical parameter values should depend on the situation of the battle.
Another approach is to leave out only the data for July 12, and not to divide the
campaign into four periods, (i.e. considering it as a whole, using the same a, b, p, q
parameters and fitting a new d parameter under these given circumstances). This model
is referred as Model 3 for this section. By following this methodology, d is found to be
1.14 with an SSR value of 1.89xl08 which is a 12% worse fit than Model 2, but still a
65% better fit than Model 1. In Model 2, a different d parameter for period 3 essentially-
removed the outlier.
Figures 46 and 47 show the fitted versus real losses for the Soviet and German
forces, respectively, for Model 3.
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Figure 44. Fitted losses plotted versus real losses for the Soviet forces for model 2, which
has four periods, and the Soviets as the attacker for the 8th day of the battle.
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Figure 45. Fitted losses plotted versus real losses for the German forces for model 2,
which has four periods, and the Soviets as the attacker for the 8 th day of the battle.
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Figure 46. Fitted losses plotted versus real losses for the Soviet forces for Model 3 which
leaves out the 8
th day of the battle, does not divide the campaign into 4 periods, uses the
same parameters as Model 1 and Model 2 and fits a new d parameter.
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Figure 47. Fitted losses plotted versus real losses for the German forces for Model 3
which leaves out the 8th day of the battle, does not divide the campaign into 4 periods,
uses the same parameters as Model 1 and Model 2 and fits a new d parameter.
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This results in the question; What if a whole new regression analysis is done to
the data, leaving out the eighth day? This model is referred to as Model 4 and by doing
so, the resulting model with an SSR value of 1.90x 108 is found to be:
B = 1.85xl0-5, /?96853B01458 (40)
/?-3.56xl0-53 B96853 /?01458 (41)
These results are far better than those found in previous sections that contained
the outlier. But, they do not however, provide a better fit than the ones found in this
section which are adjusted for the outlier. Also, it is significant that there is a big
difference in the size of the p and q parameters. Figures 48 and 49 show the fitted versus
real losses for the Soviet and German forces, respectively, for model 4.
Handling the data in parts and fitting different tactical parameters definitely
improves the fits of all models given in this section. This result is consistent with what
Hartley and Helmbold found in their studies [Ref.10].
Model 2 with an SSR value of 1.69xl0 8 has the smallest SSR value thus far.
This result largely depends on considering July 12, which is the largest outlier apart from
the rest of the data, causing a considerable decrease from the previous lowest SSR value
of 5.54 x 108 to a much lower SSR value of 1 .69 x 108 .
Model 3 finds d to be 1.14, which means an attacker advantage/defender
disadvantage. But, this circumstance again largely depends on still using the same
parameters that we had when the tactical parameter d is 1.17. Once more, this d value
indicates an attacker advantage/defender disadvantage situation.
In Model 4, leaving even only one day out (the largest outlier), improves the
model's fit tremendously when compared to the previous SSR values.
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Fitted vs. Real Soviet losses for Model 4
20000 -
18000 - o




















1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13
Days
Figure 48. Fitted losses plotted versus real losses for the Soviet forces for model 4, which
leaves out the 8
th day of the battle, does not divide the campaign into 4 periods, fits a
whole new regression model.
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Figure 49. Fitted losses plotted versus real iosses for the German forces for model 4,
which leaves out the 8 th day of the battle, does not divide the campaign into 4 periods, fits
a whole new regression model.
90
For all models, a and b parameters are significantly small and a>b. This result
suggests that individual German effectiveness was greater than individual Russian
effectiveness.
When the p and q parameters are compared, it is observed that the p parameter is
greater than the q parameter suggesting that one side's losses are more a function of his
own forces rather than being a function of the opponent's forces. This observation is
different from what Fricker found in his study.




























1.85E-51 3.56E-53 9.6853 0.1458 - 1.90E+8 0.5658
Table 30. : ^he results for the moc el which ccmsiders the battle in sep,irate parts
The negative R 2 values are mainly a result of considering certain days in the
campaign solely on their own. This results in SST value for that day being zero. This
result (i.e, the SST value being zero for a certain day) is the main reason for negative R 2
values in this section.
5. Considering change points in the model
The findings in the previous sections suggest that fitting models for separate
phases of the battle might improve the fit to the data. This section considers one or more
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attrition change points for each side. At each chosen point in the phase of battle all the
parameters pertaining to that particular side will change.
When the historical account of the battle is taken into account, it is apparent that
the Germans generally attacked between July 5, and Julyl 1, for the first seven days, and
the Soviets attacked between the days July 12, and July 18, for the last seven days. This
is the first change point to be considered and will be referred as change point 7/7.
Another approach is considering that the Germans attacked between July 5, and
July 12, for the first eight days, and the Soviets attacked between July 13, and July 18, for
the last six days. This is the second change point to be considered, and will be referred to
as change point 8/6. This type of approach (considering change points for fitting the
model to the data) is similar to what Hartley and Helmbold did in their study [Ref.10].
No tactical parameter will be considered, and only linear regression will be used
in fitting the data to the model with change points. For estimating the parameters of the
model that minimize the sum of squared residuals of the actual and estimated attrition, S-
PLUS software and the last 14 days of the aggregated data given in Table 14 in Section
IV.A.l are used.
Results for the first half of the Linear Regression model for change point 7/7 with
an SSR value of 6.53x1 7 are:
B = 8.91xl(r30 /? 64117£^ 4323 (42)
R = 2.62xl(r3l 564117/r04323 (43)
Results for the second half of the Linear Regression model for change point 7/7
with an SSR value of 8.78 x 107 are:
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5 = 1.90xlO-292 /? ,805875 ,445°2 (44)
^ = 4.37xlO-29l 5 180587 /? 344502 (45)
where both halves add up to a total SSR value of 1 .53 x 108 , and result in an R~ value of
0.7448.
Results for the first half of the Linear Regression model for change point 8/6 with
an SSR value of 1 .65 x 108 are:
5 = 7.75xl0-5 /? 44212£-28454 (46)
^ = 1.91xl0-65442,27T28454 (47)
Results for the second half of the Linear Regression model for change point 8/6
with an SSR value of 7.78 xlO7 are:
B = 1.94xl0-246 7? 2576525 187674 (48)
/? = 1.32xl0-247 5 257652 JR 187674 (49)
where both halves add up to a total SSR value of 2.43 x 108 and result in an R 2 value of
0.3488.
The SSR value for the change point 7/7 is the smallest SSR value we have seen.
It gives a 9% better fit than Model 2 of Section IV.B.4 which is 1.69xl08 . It is also
almost a 56% better fit than the one found in section IV.B.l, where only one set of
parameters is fit to the whole data. This model has the highest R 2 value we have seen
thus far, and easily the best fit we have obtained. We can conclude that fitting the model
using the change points definitely improves the fit, and this is consistent with the result
Hartley and Helmbold [Ref. 10] found in their study.
However the only concern is that the q parameter for both the change point 7/7
and change point 8/6 are negative, meaning that the number of a force's casualties
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decreases as one of the force strengths increases. The p and q parameters found in the
models are extremely high. Doubling the force size results in a dramatic change in the
outcome and this does not intuitively make sense. Since this analogy is both illogical and
unlikely, we resolve that even if the change point approach gives the lowest SSR value of
1.53xl08
,
with the change point 7/7 model, we cannot accept this fit as the best one.
This result also suggests a wide range of parameters gives similar fits to the data
In all the models explored in this section, the a and b parameters are significantly
small, and except the equations given in IV.B.5.(44), IV.B. 5. (45), a>b. This suggests
that individual German effectiveness was greater than individual Russian effectiveness.
When the p and q parameters are compared, it is observed that except the model
given in equations IV.B.5.(44), IV.B.5.(45), the p parameter is greater than the q
parameter. This comparison suggests that one side's losses are more a function of his
own forces rather than being a function of the opponent's forces, and is different from
what Fricker found in his study.
6. Using different weights
This section considers different weights for aggregating the battle data. Bracken
[Ref.8] states in his study that, "The given weights are consistent with those of studies
and models of the U.S.Army Concepts Analysis Agency. Virtually all theater-level
dynamic combat simulation models incorporate similar weights, either as inputs or as
decision parameters computed as the simulations progress." Although Bracken's points
are well taken, this study will try to fit models by using different weights for exploratory
purposes. The different weights are selected on a wholly intuitive basis and are a result
of many different trial and error calculations.
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The first weight combination will use the weights 1, 5, 20 and 40; the second
weight combination will use the weights 1, 5, 15 and 20; the third weight combination
will use the weights 1, 5, 30 and 40; the fourth weight combination will use the weights
1, 5, 20 and 30 for manpower, APC, artillery and tanks, respectively.
Note that tanks are weighted more because the Battle of Kursk was a major tank
battle. Both linear and robust LTS regression models are used to fit the data, which is
aggregated using the different weight combinations given above.
Table 31 presents the aggregated data obtained using the first weight combination.
Table 32 presents the aggregated data obtained using the second weight combination.
Table 33 presents the aggregated data obtained using the third weight combination. Table
34 presents the aggregated data obtained using the fourth weight combination.
4. First weight combination
The result for the linear regression model that gives an SSR value of
1.15xl09 andan R 2 value of 0.0870, is:
5 = 1.25xl0-38 /?522985 22746 (50)
/? = 1.60xl0-39 £52298 fl 22746 (51)
The result for the robust LTS regression model that gives an SSR value of
1.07xl09 and an R 2 value of 0.1514, is:
£ = 7.26xl0~35 # 553,25 13268 (52)
R = 5.53xl0"36 555312 /?' 3268 (53)
b. Second weight combination
The result for the linear regression model that gives an SSR value of
6.24x10 s and an R 2 value of 0.0975, is:
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Day Blue Forces Blue Losses Red Forces Red Losses
1 620173 13007 369811 14737
2 609589 14733 356025 14392
3 587405 21146 349465 8529
4 567452 22492 360184 7602
5 545652 23671 353044 8703
6 531943 17325 353484 3930
7 522036 13314 352210 5375
8 487313 36452 348085 6832
9 476711 15442 348389 4491
10 465684 13583 345740 4110
11 468799 8021 342382 4567
12 470151 4080 345266 2355
13 468706 2907 347745 1274
14 465083 6780 348400 1539
Table 31. Data on forces which are aggregated by using weight combination 1. Forces
are combat manpower, APCs, artillery and tanks, which are weighted by 1,5, 20 and 40
respectively. Here, a tank is considered to be twice as valuable as an artillery piece.
Day Blue Forces Blue Losses Red Forces Red Losses
1 568728 10842 344261 10657
2 558869 12243 335240 9407
3 542820 15891 330235 6074
4 529132 16122 342199 5377
5 512552 17846 337194 5893
6 500678 14120 336529 3150
7 491876 10579 334920 4040
8 464708 28092 332115 4812
9 454121 13052 332554 3316
10 444529 11198 330220 3165
11 448134 6076 327947 2972
12 447451 3525 329471 1875
13 446136 2067 330695 1124
14 443168 5060 330730 1364
Table 32. Data on forces which are aggregated by using weight combination 2. Forces
are combat manpower, APCs, artillery and tanks, which are weighted by 1,5, 15 and 20
respectively. Here a tank is considered to be 33% more valuable than artillery.
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Day Blue Forces Blue Losses Red Forces Red Losses
1 627223 13137 381471 14977
2 616349 15033 367635 14442
3 594015 21296 361005 8599
4 573932 22632 372314 7732
5 552052 23761 365144 8763
6 538233 17455 365474 4050
7 528316 13384 364270 5525
8 493443 36612 360025 6952
9 482771 15542 360259 4561
10 471714 13633 357580 4160
11 474809 8071 354212 4597
12 476151 4110 357056 2395
13 474726 2907 359565 1294
14 470993 6820 360220 1649
Table 33. Data on forces which are aggregated by using weight combination 3. Forces are
combat manpower, APCs, artillery and tanks, which are weighted by 1,5, 30 and 40
respectively. Here an artillery piece is considered to be six times more effective than an
APC and a tank is considered to be eight times more valuable than an APC.
Day Blue Forces Blue Losses Red Forces Red Losses
1 596213 11957 359951 12757
2 585919 13563 348535 11912
3 566765 18556 342735 7319
4 549912 19342 354224 6522
5 530702 20781 348144 7313
6 517883 15755 348004 3570
7 508526 11964 346580 4745
8 477543 32312 343085 5852
9 466931 14272 343439 3921
10 456614 12403 340940 3650
11 459969 7061 338122 3777
12 460301 3810 340316 2125
13 458926 2487 342175 1204
14 455603 5930 342520 1479
Table 34. Data on forces which are aggregated by using weight combination 4. Forces are
combat manpower, APCs, artillery and tanks, which are weighted by 1, 5, 20 and 30
respectively. Here an artillery piece is considered to be four times more effective than an
APC and a tank is considered to be six times more valuable than an APC.
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B = 2.50xlO_46 /?57638531222 (54)
R = 3.49xlO"47 557638/?31222 (55)
The result for the robust LTS regression model that gives an SSR value of
5.48xl08 and an R 2 value of 0.2072, is:
B = 7.85 xlO"36 /? 58613^ 1 1899 (56)
/? = 4.75xl0-37 558613/?" 899 (57)
c. Third weight combination
The result for the linear regression model that gives an SSR value of
1 . 1 5 x 1
9
and an R 2 value of 0.0926, is:
£ = 3.78xlO-39 /?52293£ 23513 (58)
/?-5.34xlO-40552293 /? 23513 (59)
The result for the robust LTS regression model that gives an SSR value of
1.06xl09 and an R 2 value of 0.1637, is:
B = 1.46xl0-35 J? 5 -96,9 fi'-0,S9 (60)
/? = 9.33xlO-37 fi59619 i? 10159 (61)
d. Fourth weight combination
The result for the linear regression model that gives an SSR value of
8.63X109 and an R 2 value of 0.0943, is:
5 = 2.89x1 0^ 2 R5m}B 2666 (62)
/? = 3.91xl0"43 5 54863 /? 2666 (63)
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The result for the robust LTS regression model that gives an SSR value of
7.74xl0 8 and an R 2 value of 0.1873, is:
Z? = 5.05xl0"35 /?56294£ 12631 (64)
/?-3.51xl0-?6 556294 /?' 2631 (65)
Using different weights to aggregate the data can improve the fit to the
data. The SSR value observed for the second weight combination when the data is fitted
using the Robust LTS Regression model is the lowest SSR value found for models
without the tactical parameter d. But, this result may be due to the small size of the
weights used for aggregating the data. Comparing SSR values makes sense as long as the
weights used for aggregating the data are constant for all models compared, but this is not
the case in our discussion. In such circumstances, the R 2 value is a better parameter to use
for comparison purposes rather than the SSR value because the R 2 value adjusts to scale.
How the R 2 value is computed is given in equation IV.A.l.b.(lO).
The parameters and the R 2 values for each weight combination are given in Table
34 for both linear regression and robust LTS regression models. When the/? 2 values are
compared for the models presented in this section, it is observed that weight combination
2 gives the best fit when the robust LTS regression technique is used, with the greatest
R value of 0.2072. The second best fit is found when weight combination 4 is used
with the robust LTS regression technique, and the third best fit is found when weight
combination 3 is used, again with robust LTS regression technique. These models with
different weight combinations do not give a better fit as a whole when compared to the
two models given in IV.B.l.d.(26), IV.B.l.d.(27) and IV.B.3.d.(38), IV.B.3.d.(39) where
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both models have an R 2 value of 0.2262 and use the weight combination of 1, 5, 20 and
40, for combat manpower, APCs, tanks and artillery, respectively.
When the p and q parameters are compared, it is evident that for all the models
discussed in this section, the p parameter is greater than the q parameter. This result
suggests that one side's losses are more a function of the opponent's forces rather than
being a function of his own forces, resembling earlier findings.
Except for the model given in IV.B.6.d.(64) and IV.B.6.d.(65), the a and b
parameters are significantly small and a>b for all the models discussed in this section.
This result suggests that individual German effectiveness was greater than individual
Russian effectiveness.
One can easily argue that tanks are more effective during an offensive then they
are during a defense. Likewise, artillery can be considered to have different effects on
the outcome of the battle depending on the type of a campaign. The weights used in the
second weight combination may give a better fit than the models which use the other
three weight combinations. However the relevance of the weights used is another topic
of discussion in itself. In short, it is clear according to our examples that changing the
weights can help find a better fit, but one must be careful in doing so that the issue of
relevancy to the real world is not ignored. Further investigation is recommended for
determining weight combinations.
Figures 49 and 50 show fitted losses plotted versus real losses for the Soviet and
the German forces respectively, for the robust LTS regression model using the second
weight combination which gives the best fit.
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For ease of comparison, the results for all the models using different weight
combinations and the previous two results are given in Table 35.
Fitted vs. Real Soviet Losses for the Robust LTS
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Figure 50. Fitted losses plotted versus real losses for the Soviet Forces for the robust LTS
regression model using the weight combination 2. The same pattern where the model
over/underestimates the battle in three distinctive phases is observable in this plot.
Fitted vs. Real German Losses for the Robust LTS
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Figure 5 1 . Fitted losses plotted versus real losses for the German Forces for the robust











































5.05E-35 3.51E-36 5.6294 1.2631 - 7.74E+8 0.1873
Table 35. The results for the models using different weight combinations,
combination 2 gives the best fit.
Weight
7. Force ratio and fractional exchange ratio models
In this section, Force Ratio (FR) and Fractional Exchange Ratio (FER) models are
explored and analyzed. The reason for including this approach in our discussion is that
both analysts and military staff use force ratios in models for combat outcomes and
decisions. For this purpose, five different models are investigated. The first model uses
the FR of aggregated forces as a predictor to predict the percent of casualties for each
side. The FR of blue forces is equal to the total number of aggregated blue forces divided
by the total number of aggregated red forces, and likewise for the FR of the red forces.
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The percent of casualties of the blue forces is equal to the total number of aggregated
blue losses divided by the total number of aggregated blue forces.
Figures 52 and 53 show loss ratio plotted against the FR for Soviet and German











where 7, is an indicator of the blue force or red force, and' 7 2 indicates the difference
between the attacker and defender, and are given as:
/,= 1 if Blue
7, = if Red (68)
72 = 1 if attacker
I
2
= if defender (69)
The resulting model for Model 1 with the intercept that gives an SSR value of
3.09 x 1(T3 and an R-squared value of 0.2296 (given by the S-PLUS software) is:
PC = -0.0103 - 0.00747, + 0.00687
2
+ O.O275(0F7?) (70)
where PC denotes the percent of casualties as given in IV.B.7.(64), IV.B. 7.(65), and OFR
denotes the opponent's FR for a given side.
The R-squared value given above is not calculated using the formula given in
equation IV.A. 1.(10) but given by the S-PLUS software and will be used for all the
models throughout this section.
Here, indicator variables are mainly used for the purpose of adjusting the
intercept. When the intercept term is used in the model, the correlation matrix of the
estimated coefficients shows a high correlation between the estimates that, due to high
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Loss Ratio vs. Force Ratio for Soviets for Model 1
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Figure 52. Loss ratio plotted versus force ratio for Soviet forces for model 1. Soviets lost
a higher percentage of their forces as their force ratio increased.
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Figure 53. Loss ratio plotted versus force ratio for German forces for model 1. Germans









Table 36. Correlation matrix of the estimated coefficients of the first model. Notice the
high correlation between the model's coefficients, and especially the correlation between
the intercept and the force ratio, which can result in a very bad fit.
collinearity can result in very inaccurate estimates [Ref.18]. Because of this result, an
intercept term is not used in the following models. The correlation matrix of the
estimated coefficients is given in Table 36.
Concern over whether or not leaving the intercept term out is correct or not can be
addressed by doing a hypothesis test. The null hypothesis will be, H : intercept = 0, and
the alternative hypothesis will be, H
a
: intercept ^ 0. With a significance level of
a = 0. 1 and 24 degrees of freedom, the null hypothesis will be rejected if
t > ?
.o5.24 =1-711 or if t < -t00524 = -1.71 1 . The t-statistics of the intercept of Model 1
is t = -0.2899 which is not in the rejection region. So, the null hypothesis is not
rejected, and the intercept will be assumed to be zero throughout the models.
The resulting model for Model 1 without the intercept gives an SSR value of
3.105xlO~ 3 and a multiple R-squared value of 0.7699 and looks like:
PC = 0.001/, +0.0048/ 2 +0.01 41(OFR) (71)
Table 37 shows the coefficients, standard errors, and t values for Model 1
.
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Value Std. Error t value Pr(>ltl)
11 0.0010 0.0064 0.1534 0.8793
12 0.0048 0.0039 1.2385 0.2270
OFR 0.0147 0.0045 3.2419 0.0034
Table 37. Import ant statistical values of the estimatec coefficients for Model 1
.
The positive coefficient of the indicator variable /, indicates a German advantage
(though insignificant), where the positive coefficient of the indicator variable / 2 indicates
a defender advantage, and again is insignificant. The positive coefficient of the force
ratio variable indicates that as the force ratio increases, so do the losses. Even though
statistically significant, this result does not intuitively make much sense.
The second model uses the total aggregated force ratios as a predictor to predict
the fractional exchange ratios for each side. FER for the blue forces is equal to the
percent of blue casualties divided by the percent of red casualties, and likewise for the
FER of the red forces. Figures 53 and 54 show the FER plotted against force ratio for











where /, indicates the difference between the blue force and red force, and I2 indicates
the difference between attacker and defender (time of battle) and have the values given in
IV.B.7.(68) and IV.B.7.(69).
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^igure 54. Fractional exchange ratio plotted versus force ratio for Soviet forces for
model 2.
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Figure 55. Fractional exchange ratio plotted versus force ratio for German forces for
model 2.
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Table 38 shows the coefficients, standard errors, and t values for Model 2.
Value Std. Error t value Pr(>ltl)
11 1.1849 0.4019 2.9483 0.0068
12 0.5647 0.2409 2.3441 0.0273
OFR 0.4153 0.2837 1.4638 0.1557
Table 38. Important statistical values of the estimated coefficients for model 2.
The resulting model for Model 2 that gives an SSR value of 12.120 and a multiple
R-squared of 0.6963, is:
FER = 1.18497, +0.56477, +0.4153(077?) (74)
where FER denotes the fractional exchange ratio as given in IV.B.7.(72), IV.B. 7. (73),
and OFR denotes the opponent's FR for a given side.
Similar to the results found for Model 1, the positive coefficient of indicator
variable 7, indicates a German advantage and is significant, where the positive coefficient
of indicator variable 7
2
indicates a defender advantage and is significant too. The
positive coefficient of the force ratio variable indicates that as the force ratio increases so
do the losses. Again, the coefficient is not significant and does not intuitively make
much sense.
Model 3 uses the force ratio of tanks as a predictor to predict the percent of tank
losses for each side. Figures 56 and 57 show the tank loss ratio plotted against the tank
force ratio for Soviet and German forces, respectively. The representation of Model 3
looks like:
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Tank Loss Ratio vs. Tank Force Ratio for Soviets for Model 3
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figure 56. Tank loss ratio plotted versus tank force ratio for Soviet forces for model 3.
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Figure 57. Tank loss ratio plotted versus tank force ratio for German forces for model 3.
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(BTL/BT) = L+I2 + (BT/RT)
(RTL/RT) = L+ I2 +(RT/BT)
(75)
(76)
where /, indicates the difference between blue force and red force, and 7, indicates the
difference between attacker and defender (time of battle) and have the values given in
IV.B.7.(68) and IV.B.7.(69). BTL, RTL, BT and RT denote blue tank loss, red tank loss,
number of blue tanks and number of red tanks, respectively.
Table 39 shows the coefficients, standard errors and t values for Model 3.
Value Std. Error t value Pr(>ltl)
11 -0.2703 0.092 -2.9377 0.007
12 0.1442 0.0291 4.9549
OTFR 0.1375 0.0367 3.747 0.0009
Table 39. Critica statistical values <}f the estimated coefficients of mode 3.
The resulting model for model 3, which gives an SSR value of 0.220 and a
Multiple R-Squared value of 0.7077 is:
PTL = -0.27037, +0.14427, +0.1375(<97/F7?) (77)
where PTL and OTFR denote the percent of tank losses and opponent's tank force ratio,
respectively for a given side.
In contrast to the results we found for Model 1 and Model 2, the negative
coefficient of indicator variable 7, indicates a Soviet advantage, and is significant. The
positive coefficient of indicator variable 7
2
indicates a defender advantage, and is also
significant. The positive coefficient of the force ratio variable indicates that as the force
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ratio increases, so do the force's losses. Again this is statistically significant but
intuitively does not make much sense.
The fourth model uses the total aggregated tank force ratios as a predictor to
predict the FER of tanks for each side. The FER of tanks for the blue forces is equal to
the percent of blue tank losses divided by percent of red tank losses, and likewise for the
FER of tanks for the red forces. Figures 58 and 59 show the FER of tanks plotted against
Force ratio of tanks for Soviet and German forces, respectively. The representation of
Model 4 looks like:
(BTL/BT)/(RTL/RT) = /,+/, + (BT/RT)
(RTL/RT)/(BTL/BT) = L +I2 +(RT/BT)
(78)
(79)
where /, indicates the difference between the blue force and red force, and I2 indicates
the difference between attacker and defender and have the values given in IV.B. 7.(68)
and IV.B.7.(69). BTL, RTL, BT and RT denote blue tank loss, red tank loss, the number
of blue tanks and the number of red tanks, respectively.
Table 40 shows the coefficients, standard errors, and t values for Model 4.
Value Std. Error t value Pr(>ltl)
11 -0.1242 1.8843 -0.0659 0.948
12 2.2276 0.5959 3.7382 0.001
OTFR 0.2865 0.7517 0.3811 0.7064
Table 40. Important statistical values of the estimated coefficients of model 4.
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Figure 58. Tank fractional exchange ratio plotted versus tank force ratio for Soviet forces
for model 4.
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Figure 59.Tank fractional exchange ratio plotted versus tank force ratio for German
forces for model 4.
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The resulting model for Model 4, which gives an SSR value of 92.637 and a
multiple R-squared value of 0.4941 is:
TFER = -0.1242/, +2.2276/, + 0.2&65(OTFR) (80)
where TFER and OTFR denote the FER of tanks and the opponent's tank FR for a given
side.
Similar to the results we found for Model 3, the negative coefficient of indicator
variable /, , indicates a Soviet advantage and is not significant. The positive coefficient of
indicator variable I
2
indicates a defender advantage and is significant. The positive
coefficient of the force ratio variable indicates that as the force ratio increases so does
your losses. Again the coefficient is not significant and intuitively does not make much
sense.
The fifth model uses the same setup as Model 1, but it will do. so by using the
different weights first introduced in section IV.B.6 as the second weight combination,
namely 1,5, 15 and 20 for manpower, APC, artillery and tanks, respectively. Figures 60
and 61 show the loss ratio plotted against the force ratio for Soviet and German forces,











where /, indicates the difference between Blue force and Red force, and I 2 indicates the
difference between attacker and defender and have the values given in IV.B. 7. (68) and
IV.B.7.(69).
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Figure 60. Loss ratio plotted versus force ratio for Soviet forces for model 5.
Tank Fractional Exchange Ratio vs. Tank Force Ratio for Germans for Model 5
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Figure 61. Loss ratio plotted versus force ratio for German forces for model 5.
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where /, indicates the difference between Blue force and Red force, and 72 indicates the
difference between attacker and defender (time of battle) and have the values given in
IV.B.7.(68) and IV.B.7.(69).
Table 41 shows the coefficients, standard errors, and t values for Model 5.
Value Std. Error t value Pr(>ltl)
11 -0.0018 0.0072 -0.2544 0.8013
12 0.0053 0.0039 1.3592 0.1862
OFR 0.0159 0.0049 3.2633 0.0032
Table 41. Important statistical values of the estimated coefficients of Model 5.
The resulting model for Model 5, which gives an SSR value of 0.0032546 and a
multiple R-squared value of 0.7679 is:
PC = -0.00187, +0.0053/
2
+ O.O159(0F7?) (83)
where the notation has the same meaning as in Model 1
.
Similar to the results we found for Model 3 and Model 4, the negative coefficient
of indicator variable 7, indicates a Soviet advantage and is not significant. The positive
coefficient of indicator variable 7
2
indicates a defender advantage and is not significant.
The positive coefficient of the force ratio variable indicates that as the force ratio
increases so do the losses. The coefficient is statistically significant and again, this
interpretation intuitively does not make much sense.
In general, in the models we investigated in this section, the indicator variable 7 2
is always positive, different from the result we found in the sections, which investigated
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the tactical parameter d. This observation suggests that it is advantageous to be the
defender, not the attacker. Another interesting, yet ironic, result is the positive force ratio
coefficient found in the models throughout the section, suggesting that the more powerful
you are, the more you lose, which intuitively does not make much sense.
When the plots are investigated it is seen that, the higher the force ratio or FER is,
the less the loss is, except for the Soviets in Model 1, Model 3 and Model 5. So, the
results are telling somewhat different than what the plots are telling. This may be due to
the interpretation that fitting the logarithmically transformed equations does not
necessarily gives the best fit in the original form.
Table 42 summarizes the results found in this section.
11 12 Predictor Multiple R-squared
Model 1 0.001 0.0048 0.0147 0.7699
Model 2 1.1849 0.5647 0.4153 0.6963
Model 3 -0.2703 0.1442 0.1375 0.7077
Model 4 -0.1242 2.2276 0.2865 0.4941
Model 5 -0.0018 0.0053 0.0159 0.7679
Table 42. Results for the section investigating the force ratio and the fractional exchange
ratio models.
When the overall results given in Table 42 are examined it is seen that Model 1
and Model 2 have positive /, coefficients, which indicates a German advantage while the
rest of the models have negative /, coefficients, which indicates a Soviet advantage. All
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models have positive I 2 coefficients, which indicates a defender advantage. The first
model with the highest multiple R-squared value gives the best fit.
8. Fitting the standard Lanchester equations
This section fits the basic Lanchester Equations, (i.e., Lanchester Linear,
Lanchester Square and Lanchester Logarithmic models), to the Battle of Kursk data. The
basic Lanchester equations are given in I.B.(l) and LB. (2).
For the Lanchester linear model where p=q= 1 , the loss for one side will be equal
to the product of the existing number of forces of both sides, and a coefficient. The
Lanchester linear model will look like;
B = aRB (84)
R = bBR (85)
This model is solved like a typical regression through the origin equation and the
resulting model for the Lanchester linear model, which gives an SSR value of 6.24xl08
is:
B = 6.6834 xlO~*RB (86)
R = 2.6893 x\0~&BR (87)
Figures 62 and 63 show fitted losses plotted versus real losses for Soviet and
German forces, respectively, for the Lanchester linear model.
For the Lanchester Square Model, where p-\ and q=0, the loss for one side will
be equal to the product of the existing number of forces of the opponent and a coefficient.
The Lanchester square model will look like;
B = aR (88)
R=bB (89)
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Fitted vs. Real Soviet losses for Lanchester Linear Model
O- real Soviet losses
-
— fitted Soviet losses
Days
Figure 62. Fitted losses plotted versus real losses for Soviet forces for the Lanchester
linear model. The same three-phase pattern where the model over/underestimates the
battle in three distinctive phases is observable in this plot for the model, which uses the
Lanhester linear model, too.
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Figure 63. Fitted losses plotted versus real losses for German forces for the Lanchester
linear model. Eight days are underestimated while six days are overestimated.
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The resulting model for Lanchester square model that gives an SSR value of
6.79x10 s is:
B = 0.0335/? (90)
R = 0.00985 (91)
The high value of the a parameter in the above equation indicates that the
Germans fought three times better than the Soviets.
Figures 64 and 65 show fitted losses plotted versus real losses for Soviet and
German forces, respectively, for the Lanchester square model.
For the Lanchester logarithmic model where p=0 and q= 1 , the loss for one side
will be equal to the product of the existing number of forces of its own and a coefficient.
Lanchester logarithmic model will look like:
B = aB (92)
R=bR (93)
The resulting model for Lanchester logarithmic model, which gives an SSR value
of 6.57xl08 is:
B = 0.0243S (94)
R = 0.0131/? (95)
Figures 66 and 67 show fitted losses plotted versus real losses for Soviet and
German forces, respectively, for the Lanchester logarithmic model.
The basic Lanchester Equations do not give the best fit for the Battle of Kursk
data. Out of the three Lanchester Models analyzed, the Lanchester linear model gives the
best fit (i.e., smallest SSR value).
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Figure 64. Fitted losses plotted versus real losses for Soviet forces for the Lanchester
square model. The same three-phase pattern where the model over/underestimates the
battle in three distinctive phases is observable in this plot for the model, which uses the
Lanhester square model, too.
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Figure 65. Fitted losses plotted versus real losses for German forces for the Lanchester
square model. Eight days are underestimated while six days are overestimated.
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Figure 67. Fitted losses plotted versus real losses for German forces for the Lanchester
logarithmic model.
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Again in all Lanchester Models, the a and b parameters are significantly small and
a>b.
Fricker's findings were closest to Lanchester' s logarithmic model, while
Bracken's findings were closest to Lanchester's linear model. Out of the three basic
Lanchester models, it is the Lanchester linear model that best fits the Battle of Kursk
data. The Lanchester logarithmic model gives the second best fit for the Battle of Kursk
data, while the Lanchester square model gives the third best (i.e., the worst) fit for the
Battle of Kursk data.
9. Fitting Morse-Kimball equations
This section will fit the Morse-Kimball Equations to the Battle of Kursk data,
Morse and Kimball suggest that one side's losses do not depend solely on the opponent's
forces, losses also depend on one's own failures and other mechanical breakdowns too,
like the case in the logarithmic law. The Morse-Kimball Equations are:
B = aR + a
]
B (96)
R = bB + a2R (97)
These equations are fit separately for the Germans and the Soviets, and the
resulting model for the Morse-Kimball Equations, which gives an SSR value of
5.51xl08 and an R 2 value of 0.2297 is:
B = -0.0412/? + 0.05375 (98)
R = 0.06035 - 0.0707/? (99)
Figures 68 and 69 show fitted losses plotted versus real losses for Soviet and
German forces, respectively, for the Morse-Kimball Equations model.
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Figure 68. Fitted losses plotted versus real losses for the Soviet forces for the model using
Morse Kimball Equations. The same three-phase pattern where the model
over/underestimates the battle in three distinctive phases is observable in this plot for the
model, which uses Morse Kimball equations, too.
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Figure 69. Fitted losses plotted versus real losses for the German forces for the Morse
Kimball Equations Model.
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Fitting Morse-Kimball Equations to the Battle of Kursk data improves the fit.
The SSR value of 5.51 xlO8 is one of the lowest SSR values we have so far. But, just as
in the models used for the change points approach for each side in section IV.B.5, the
parameters physically do not make sense.
For the blue force, the negative a parameter indicates that the more the red forces
there are, the less the number of blue casualties. For the red force, the negative a2
parameter indicates that the greater the number of the red forces is, fewer red casualties
are going to be. This physically does not make much sense; so, even if fitting Morse-
Kimball equations give a low SSR value of 5.51xl08 , we cannot accept this fit.
10. Fitting the parameters found by Bracken and Fricker
In this section, the parameters for the. Ardennes data found in Bracken and
Fricker' s studies will be used to fit the Battle of Kursk data.
a. Bracken 's parameters
In his study, Bracken's conclusion for the Lanchester Model with the
tactical parameter is given as:
5 = 8xl0_9(— or—)R ]B ] (100)
10 8
R = \x\0~\— or—)B lR ] (101)
8 10
Figures 70 and 7 1 show fitted losses plotted versus real losses for Soviet
and German forces, respectively, for the parameters of Bracken's model (with the tactical
parameter) given above, which yields an SSR value of 2.39 xlO9 for the Battle of Kursk
data.
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Figure 70. Fitted losses plotted versus real losses for Soviet forces for Bracken's model
with the tactical parameter d. Bracken's Ardennes parameters always underestimated the
Soviet losses for the Battle of Kursk.
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Figure 71. Fitted losses plotted versus real losses for German forces for Bracken's model
with the tactical parameter d. Except the last three days of the battle, Bracken's
Ardennes parameters always underestimated the German losses for the whole Battle of
Kursk data.
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Bracken's conclusion for the Lanchester model without the tactical
parameter is given as:
B = SxlQ^RuB01 (102)
/? = lxl0"85u /?a7 (103)
Figures 72 and 73 show fitted losses plotted versus real losses for Soviet
and German forces, respectively, for the parameters of Bracken's model (without the
tactical parameter) given above, which yields an SSR value of 2.46 xlO9 for the Battle of
Kursk data.
Fitting Brackens' s parameters to the Battle of Kursk data does not
improve the model's fit and gives the highest SSR value thus far. It is significant that
Bracken's parameters always underestimates the real casualties for the Battle of Kursk
data.
b. Fticker's parameters
In Fricker's study, the conclusion for the Lanchester model with the
tactical parameter is given as:
5 = 4.7xl0" 27 (—-— or 0.8093)£5 (104)
0.8093




Figures 74 and 75 show fitted losses plotted versus real losses for Soviet
and German forces, respectively, for the parameters of Fricker's model (with the tactical
parameter) given above that yields an SSR value of 3.02 xlO9 for the Battle of Kursk
data.
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Figure 72. Fitted losses plotted versus real losses for the Soviet forces for Bracken's
model without the tactical parameter d. Bracken's Ardennes parameters always
underestimated the Soviet losses for the Battle of Kursk data.









Cm >^ O- real German losses








o * o o
o
-
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
Days
Figure 73. Fitted losses plotted versus real losses for the German forces for Bracken's
model without the tactical parameter d. With the exception of the last three days of the
battle, Bracken's Ardennes parameters always underestimated the German losses for the
whole Battle of Kursk data.
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Figure 74. Fitted losses plotted versus real losses for Soviet forces for Fricker's model
with the tactical parameter d. Fricker's Ardennes parameters always underestimated the
Soviet losses for the Battle of Kursk.
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Figure 75. Fitted losses plotted versus real losses for Soviet forces for Fricker's model
with the tactical parameter d. Fricker's Ardennes parameters always underestimated the
German losses for the Battle of Kursk.
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Fricker's conclusion for the Lanchester model with the air sortie data
added is given as:
B = 2.7 x 1 (T 24 (—!— or 0.797 \)B46 ( 1 06)
0.7971






Figures 76 and 77 show fitted losses plotted versus real losses for Soviet
and German forces, respectively, for the parameters of Fricker's model (with air sortie
data added) given above, which yields an SSR value of 2.77 xlO9 for the Battle of Kursk
data.
Like Bracken's models, fitting Fricker's parameters to the Battle of Kursk
data does not improve the model's fit, it gives the highest SSR value in this study so far.
Fricker's parameters always underestimate the real casualties for the Battle of Kursk data.
This finding is similar to the one for Bracken's parameters.
In general, fitting Bracken's or Fricker's Ardennes parameters to the Battle of
Kursk data does not improve the fit; they both give the highest SSR value we have in this
study so far. This result suggests that the parameters of one battle data cannot be used to
predict another. Each battle has its own unique parameters which cannot be applied to
another one battle.
Another interesting finding is that when Bracken's or Fricker's Ardennes
parameters are applied to Kursk data, they always underestimate the daily attrition rates.
This finding suggests that Battle of Kursk was a much more intense battle than the
Ardennes campaign.
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Figure 76. Fitted losses plotted versus real losses for Soviet forces for Fricker's model
with the air sortie data added. Notice that Fricker's Ardennes parameters always
underestimated the Soviet losses for the Battle of Kursk.
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Figure 77. Fitted losses plotted versus real losses for German forces for Fricker's model
with air sortie data added. Notice that Fricker's Ardennes parameters always
underestimated the German losses for the Battle of Kursk.
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1 1 . Summary of results





































































































































































































2.7E-24 1.6E-23 4.6 0.7971 2.79E+9 -2.9021
Table 42. Results of all the models explored and investigated in Chapter IV.
The R 2 value (0.9975) given for Clemens' linear regression model is the self
reported value by Clemens and must have been calculated differently than the R 2 values
calculated throughout the thesis. When recomputed, a negative R 2 value is found.
Clemens provided four digits of precision in his estimates of p and q, while
Bracken and Fricker gave two. The R~ values that are found for the models, which do
not use the parameters from other studies, are calculated using parameters with four digits
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of precision. The slightly negative R 2 values found for some of these models are not a
result of using low precision.
When the above results are examined, it is seen that the best fitting model for the
Battle of Kursk data is the robust LTS regression model used in section IV.B.l, with an
SSR value of 5.54xl08 and an R 2 value of 0.2262. This finding is true for the models
that handle the battle in one phase.
When the models which consider the change points are examined, it is seen that
the model with the change point 7/7 is the one with the best fit, with an SSR value of
1.53xl08 and an R 2 value of 0.7448.
Figure 78 shows the p and q values plotted for every model whose parameters are
given in Table 42, except for the models with the change points since they have very
large p and q parameters. The p and q values are also excluded for the model using the
Morse-Kimball equations since these equations do not use p and q parameters.
















Figure 78. p and q parameters plotted for all the models given in Table 42.
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When the pattern seen in Figure 78 is examined it is apparent that p and q
parameters are clustered in two regions—one around the p=5-6, q=l-4 region, and the
other around the q=l-6, p=0 region.
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. CONCLUSIONS
This thesis explores the applications of regression models on data from the World
War II Battle of Kursk—the greatest single tank battle in history. The analysis tools used
are two regression techniques, linear regression and robust LTS regression. The results
and a brief interpretation of each regression model are given in the model's
corresponding section. The results obtained from the statistical regression models are
intended to provide insight into the Battle of Kursk, as well as into combat modeling in
general.
When all the regression models are viewed together the following conclusions are
reached.
• It is observed that the original Lanchester equations do not fit to the Battle of
Kursk data, and therefore may not be appropriate for modeling the combat. Of
the three ill-fitting Lanchester equations, the best fit is obtained by applying the
linear law, which is used for modeling ancient warfare or area fire.
• The parameters derived from Bracken and Fricker's Ardennes studies do not
apply to the Battle of Kursk data. This implies that there are no unique
parameters that apply to all battles.
• Another interesting result with respect to Bracken's methodology and models is
that, upon a closer examination of his findings, the SSR values given by multiple
p and q values are in the same vicinity, as seen when plotted using a 3-D plot.
This is clearly seen in Figures 79 through 82, which cover the breadth of
approaches and show a variety of fits.
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Figure 79 shows the SSR values plotted versus p and q parameters using
Bracken's model, with the tactical parameter, for the Ardennes Campaign data when
a = 8x1
0"9
, b = 1*1
0"8
and d=l.25.
The SSR values do not change much in the vicinity of the best fit. Except for the
spike seen on the upper far right corner, the SSR values are relatively insensitive to p and
q values. Figure 80 gives a closer look at the region in which the lowest SSR value is
found when /?=1 and q=\. A broad range of parameters fit about the same in a valley of
the surface as p increases and q decreases.
For Bracken's model, without the tactical parameter, for the Ardennes Campaign
data when a = 8x1 -9
, b = lxlO
-8
,
p=\ .3 and q=0.7, the same pattern observed in Figures
79 and 80 also hold true, and this is true for other/? and/? analyses too.
Figures 81 and 82 show the 3-D grid plots for Bracken's model with the tactical
parameter for the Battle of Kursk data when a = 1.2xl0~8 , b = 9x1
0"9
and d=0.9. Figure
82 provides a closer look at the region in which the lowest SSR value is found (i.e., when
/?=0.1 and q=2.0). This pattern is similar to what we have seen for Ardennes.
For Bracken's model, without the tactical parameter, for the Battle of Kursk data
when a = 1 .2x1
0"8
, b - 9x1
0"9
,
/?=0.3 and g=1.8, the same pattern observed in Figure 81
and Figure 82 also holds true. This result is again similar to what was found for the
Ardennes data, suggesting that a broad range of possible models fit just about as well.
In the light of the findings stated above, it is a logical next step to have a look at
the model's residual surface when a and b depend on /? and q, and d=\. The results are
given in Figures 81 through 84, where a and b parameters are chosen to minimize SSR
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"igure 79. SSR values plotted versus p and q parameters using Bracken's model with the
tactical parameter for Ardennes Campaign data.
A closer look at Bracken's model with d for Ardennes Campaign data
&>.
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Figure 80. A closer look at the lowest SSR value for Bracken's model with the tactical
parameter, for Ardennes Campaign data when p=l and q=\.
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Figure 81. SSR values plotted versus p and q parameters using Bracken's model with the
tactical parameter for Battle of Kursk data. This pattern holds true for other cases too.
Figure 82. A closer look at the lowest SSR value for Bracken's model with the tactica
parameter, for the Battle of Kursk data when p=0.\ and g=2.0. The observed pattern is
similar to what is observed for Ardennes.
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where i is the index of the days in a given battle, and n is the number of days in a given
battle.
Figure 83 shows the 3-D plot of SSR values found for the Battle of Kursk data,
where p values are varied between -0.5 and 10.0 with increments of 0.1, q values are
varied between -1.0 and 3.0 with increments of 0.1, d=1.0, a and b values depend on p
and q, and are determined by equations V.A.(108) and V.A.(109). Figure 85 shows the
same area using a contour filled plot. A contour plot displays the contours of equally
fitting p and q values in terms of SSR. This surface was generated with d fixed at 1.0.
The models found in Fricker, Bracken and Clemens used a d parameter; hence their place
on the surface does not necessarily measure the goodness of their fit. Furthermore,
Fricker and Clemens used differently formatted data.
Figures 85 and 86 represent a detailed description of the region with the best fit.
Figure 85 shows the 3-D plot of the SSR values found for the Battle of Kursk data, where
p values are varied between 3.0 and 9.0 with increments of 0.1, q values are varied
between 0.0 and 2.5 with increments of 0.1, d=1.0, a and b values depend on/? and q, and
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Figure 83. 3D plot of SSR values for Battle of Kursk data, p values are varied between -
0.5 and 10.0 with increments of 0.1, q values are varied between -1.0 and 3.0 with
increments of 0.1, d=1.0, a and b values depend on p and q.
4 6
p parameter
Figure 84. Contour filled plot of SSR values for Battle of Kursk data, p values are varied
between -0.5 and 10.0 with increments of 0.1, q values are varied between -1.0 and 4.0
with increments of 0.1, d=1.0, a and b values depend on/? and q. Also shown are each of
the similar findings around the same area.
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"igure 85. 3D plot of SSR values for Battle of Kursk data, p values are varied between
3.0 and 9.0 with increments of 0.1, q values are varied between 0.0 and 2.5 with
increments of 0.1, d=1.0, a and b values depend on/? and q.







Figure 86. Contour filled plot of SSR values for Battle of Kursk data, p values are variec
between 3.0 and 9.0 with increments of 0.1, q values are varied between 0.0 and 2.5 with
increments of 0. 1 , d= 1 .0, a and b values depend on p and q.
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are given as in equations V.A.(108) and V.A.(109). Figure 86 shows the same area using
a contour filled plot.
The above results imply that there is no absolute best fit, as long as one stays in
the broad vicinity of the identified best fit, it is likely to have similar fits, and there is not
just one set of parameters that clearly gives a best fit. One can still find a similar fit as
long as the estimated parameters are in the vicinity of the best fit. However, the area of
the surface bounded by the lowest contour in Figure 86 says, roughly, the best fitting
models have a q parameter between 0.5 and 2, while the p parameter is between 4 and 8.
This observation is significant in that the Lanchester linear and square laws have a p
value of 1 and the logarithmic law has a/? value of 0. When p=\, the best fitting model
has a 9% higher SSR value than the lowest found value of 5.54xl08 ; which was found
by using LTS regression.
A wide range of parameters fit equally well, but the question is, is this true for
Ardennes campaign data too? Figure 87 shows the contour filled plot for the Ardennes
data together with the best fits determined by Bracken and Fricker. Again, a and b
depend on p and q, and d-\. The a and b parameters are chosen to minimize SSR for
regression the through origin, and are given in equations V.A.(108) and V.A.(109).
When Figure 87 is examined, one can see that the general pattern observed for the Kursk
data is also observed for the Ardennes campaign data.
The bottom line conclusion is that different researchers using different methods
all came up with very different answers because the surface around the models' fits is
very flat.
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^igure 87. Contour filled plot of SSR values for Ardennes Campaign data, p values are
varied between -6.0 and 6.0 with increments of 0.1, q values are varied between -6.0 and
6.0 with increments of 0.1, d=1.0, a and b values depend on p and q. Note: Fricker's
method has a better R 2
,
this is not apparent from this figure which uses differently
formatted data and no tactical parameter d.
Fricker's methodology, when applied to Battle of Kursk data gives a better fit
than Bracken's. This conclusion implies that the algorithm Fricker introduces in
his study is useful in fitting the data and can be used in further studies.
Throughout the study, with the exception of the two models whose results are
given in equations IV.A.2.(14), IV.A.2.(15), IV.A.2.(18), IV.A.2.(19), and the
models with the negative exponential parameters, the a parameter is always
greater than the b parameter. This consistency implies that individually, German
soldiers are more lethal than Soviet soldiers, and they also fought better than the
Soviets. Also, according to this difference in parameters, German military
expertise was much better than the Soviets' in the Battle of Kursk. This finding
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was consistent throughout the battle. Despite their lack of military expertise, the
Soviets won the battle due to their massive amount of supplies and manpower.
• Another significant result for the a and b parameters is that both are very small,
and this result is consistent with Fricker's findings.
• The best fit to the data is observed when robust LTS regression model is applied.
Robust LTS regression gives the smallest SSR value, which is 5.54xl08 when
d=l.O. This finding was significant because it indicates no attacker/defender
advantage.
• The d parameter, which gives the best fit using the linear regression model, is
found to be 1.17. Using the a, b, p and q parameters found in equations
IV.B.3.b.(40) and IV.B.3.b.(41), the data is analyzed in four distinct periods. The
analysis revealed that it was usually advantageous to be the attacker in Battle of
Kursk campaign. The only two days when the defender had the advantage was
the first day when Germans attacked and the eighth day when the Soviets
attacked. The Battle of Kursk was a major tank battle. Since a tank is an assault
weapon, and is not optimally used as a defense weapon, the rationalization that
the attacker will always have the advantage is considered a natural outcome of
this battle.
• Finding only one tactical parameter d, and refusing to vary from that parameter
through the battle is apparently a mistaken approach. The tactical parameter for a
battle in which one side attacks a defender behind heavily fortified positions must
not be the same with the tactical parameter for a battle in which one side is
counterattacking and the other is making a hasty defense.
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The tactical parameter in the first half of the battle, being greater than the tactical
parameter in the second half, indicates that the Germans were better than Soviets
both in attack and defense. This finding is especially consistent with the tactical
parameter value of 0.32 found on the eighth day, during which the Soviets
counterattacked.
The plots investigated in Section IV.B.7 show that if the force ratio is higher, then
loss will be reduced because, as force ratio increases, loss decreases. This result
is consistent with the force ratio approach, which is widely used in military
simulation models today, showing the effectiveness and validity of the approach.
The R 2 values given in Table 32 indicate that the model with the change point 7/7
represents the data with the best fit, with an R 2 value of 0.7748. The second best
fit is observed with the model that divides the campaign in four different parts,
with an R 2 value of 0.5689. This suggests that even an individual battle cannot
be viewed as homogenous.
Some models have negative R 2 values, meaning that one can have a better
estimate of the attrition just by using the mean value, as opposed to using the
model itself, and going into the modeling business. In other words, it is better to
use the mean value for estimating the attrition instead of using the estimate given
by the models, which have negative R 2 values. The negative R 2 values found in
section IV.A.2 for Fricker's models occurred because the parameters were
rounded off in Fricker [Ref.6]. Had more precise values been available the R 2
values would have been positive.
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B.
Throughout the thesis, the robust LTS regression technique gives better fits to the
data than the linear regression technique. This is because the robust regression
models are useful for fitting linear relationships by discounting outlying data
when the given data in hand contains significant outliers, as in our case.
Combat models cannot provide clear-cut results to a military analyst. One cannot
determine the outcome of a battle precisely by using combat models. Together
with their use to gain insight about the battles and campaigns that happened in the
past, combat models help to make better decisions by enabling the decision-maker
to compare different alternatives using various combat modeling techniques.
RECOMMENDATIONS
The models presented in this thesis study do not include nor analyze total
manpower data. Data for total manpower is present in the KDB and can be examined in
the future studies.
The weights used for aggregating the forces are subject to research. A more
complex model, one that includes the weights of weapons systems as unknown
parameters to be estimated, can be set up and analyzed to find a better fit. And when the
complex and numerous different weapon systems of today's military are considered, this
shows potential to be a very interesting research topic.
Weapon systems other than the featured tanks in this study can be used to find a
model with a better fit using a homogenous weapons scenario.
In this thesis, the change points for each side is on the same day. Another way to
find a better fit would be to use different change points for each side, rather than using
the same change point.
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A final recommendation for the continued analysis of the Kursk database is to try
to fit additional models other than the Lanchester models.
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APPENDIX A. DETAILED INFORMATION ON TYPES OF MANPOWER
AND WEAPON SYSTEM LOSSES FOR BATTLE OF KURSK
A. TYPE OF MANPOWER CASUALTIES
Figure 88 shows the fraction of each type of casualty relative to total casualties.
When all of four casualty types are considered, WIA accounted for the largest amount of
casualties for both sides, and the German WIA fraction (0.751) was significantly higher
than the Soviet WIA fraction (0.543). The next largest Soviet casualty fraction was for
CMIA (0.230) while CMIA fraction accounted for the third largest German casualty
fraction (0.031). The Soviet CMIA fraction was over 7 times greater than the German
fraction. KIA accounted for the second largest German casualty fraction (0.15) while
KIA fraction accounted for the third largest Soviet casualty fraction (0.217). Fewer than
1 percent of total casualties were DNBI for the Soviet (0.008), while DNBI accounted for
almost 7 percent of total German casualties (0.65), which is over 7 times greater than the
Soviet fraction.
Figure 89 shows the fraction of each type of casualty relative to initial OH
Personnel. When all four casualty types are considered, WIA accounted for the largest
amount of casualties for both sides again, and the Soviet WIA fraction (0.126) was
slightly higher than the German WIA fraction (0.089). The next largest Soviet casualty
fraction was for CMIA (0.053), while CMIA fraction accounted for the smallest German
casualty fraction (0.003). The Soviet CMIA fraction was over 14 times greater than the
German fraction (14.401). KIA accounted for the second largest German casualty
fraction (0.018) while KIA fraction accounted for the third largest Soviet casualty
fraction (0.050). While less than 1 percent of total casualties were DNBI for the both
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sides, German DNBI fraction (0.007) was almost four (3.84) times higher than the Soviet
DNBI fraction (0.002).



















Figure 88. Fraction of personnel casualty types relative to total personnel casualties.
WIA accounted for the largest amount of casualties for both sides.
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Figure 89. Fraction of personnel casualty types relative to total initial OH personnel.
WIA accounted for the largest amount of casualties for both sides.
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Figures 90 through 97 show daily and cumulative casualties for each casualty type
of KIA, WIA, CMIA and DNBI consecutively. The largest differences are in KIA and
CMIA. The Soviets had almost 5 (4.621) KIA for every one German KIA. The gap is
even bigger for CMIA, with almost 24 (23.905) CMIA for every German CMIA. KIA
and CMIA together, accounted for almost 45 (0.448) percent of total Soviet casualties,
while they accounted for only slightly over 18(0.183) percent of total German casualties.
For both sides, the majority of casualties were WIA. The Soviets had more than twice
(2.343) as many WIA as the Germans.
The peak daily combat casualty rates occurred on July 5 and 12. The German
peak daily rate was on July 5. The first day of the German attack was July 5, when only a
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Figure 90. Daily number of total personnel casualties that are KIA. KIA denotes
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Figure 91. Daily cumulative number of total personnel casualties that are KIA. KIA
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Figure 92. Daily number of total personnel casualties that are WIA. WIA denotes





Figure 93. Daily cumulative number of total personnel casualties that are WIA. WIA
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Figure 94. Daily number of total personnel casualties that are CMIA. CMIA denotes
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Figure 95. Daily cumulative number of total personnel casualties that are CMIA. CMIA
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Figure 96. Daily number of total personnel casualties that are DNBI. DNBI denotes





















1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
Days
15
Figure 97. Daily cumulative number of total personnel casualties which are DNBI. DNBI
denotes casualties due to disease and nonbattle injuries.
B. TYPE OF TANK LOSSES
Figure 98 shows the fraction of each type of tank loss relative to total tank losses.
When both types of losses are considered, DAMAGED accounted for the largest amount
of tank losses (0.849) for the German side, while DST+ABND accounted for the largest
amount of tank losses (0.543) for the Soviet side. Consequently, DST+ABND accounted
for the 15 (0.150) percent of tank losses for the Germans and DAMAGED accounted
for the 54 (0.543) percent of tank losses for the Soviets. Overall, for every 1
DAMAGED Soviet tank, 1 (1.008) German tank was DAMAGED, and for every 1
DST+ABND German tank, almost 7 (6.655) Soviet tanks were DST+ABND.
Figure 99 shows the fraction of each type of tank loss relative to initial amount of
OH tank. When both types of losses are considered, again DAMAGED accounted for the
largest amount of tank losses for the German side, while DST+ABND accounted for the
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largest amount of tank losses for the Soviet side. 89 (0.888) percent of the initial amount
of OH German tank was DAMAGED, while only one sixth of that amount, i.e. 16 (0.157)
percent, was DST+ABND. Fifty (0.495) percent of the initial amount of OH Soviet tanks
was DST+ABND, while 42 (0.415) percent, was DST+ABND.
Figures 100 through 103 show daily and cumulative tank losses for each type of
tank losses, namely DST+ABND and DAMAGED consecutively.
C. TYPE OF APC LOSSES
Figure 104 shows the fraction of each type of APC loss relative to total APC
losses. When both types of losses are considered, DAMAGED accounted for the largest
amount of APC losses (0.739) for the Germans, while DST+ABND accounted for the
0.9 -,















Figure 98. Fraction of each type of tank loss relative to total tank losses. When both types
of losses are considered, DAMAGED accounted for the largest amount of tank losses for
the German side, while DST+ABND accounted for the largest amount of tank losses for
the Soviet side
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Figure 99. Fraction of each type of tank loss relative to initial number of OH tanks. When
both types of losses are considered, DAMAGED accounted for the largest amount of tank
losses for the German side, while DST+ABND accounted for the largest amount of tank
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Figure 100. Daily number of total tank losses that are DST+ABND. DST+ABND denotes
the weapons that are destroyed or abandoned. Soviets had no tanks that are DST+ABND

























Figure 101. Cumulative number of tank losses that are DST+ABND. DST+ABND




D Soviet Tanks Damaged
German Tanks Damaged
Figure 102. Daily number of total tank losses that are damaged. Soviets had no damaged
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Figure 103. Daily cumulative number of total tank losses that are damaged.
largest amount of APC losses (0.623) for the Soviet side. Consequently,
DST+ABND accounted for the 26 (0.260) percent of APC losses for the Germans and
DAMAGED accounted for the 38 (0.376) percent of APC losses for the Soviets.
Overall, for every 1 DAMAGED Soviet APC, more than 3 (3.227) German APCs were
DAMAGED, and for every 1 DST+ABND German APC, 1.46 Soviet APCs were
DST+ABND.
Figure 105 shows the fraction of each type of APC loss relative to initial amount
of OH APC. When both types of losses are considered, again DAMAGED accounted for
the largest amount of APC losses for the German side, while DST+ABND accounted for
the largest amount of APC losses for the Soviet side. Twelve (0.121) percent of the
initial amount of OH German APC were DAMAGED, while only one third of that
amount, i.e. 4 (0.042) percent, were DST+ABND. Fourteen (0.142) percent of the initial
161
amount of OH Soviet APC were DST+ABND, while 9 (0.086) percent, were
DST+ABND.
Figures 106 through 109 show daily and cumulative APC losses for each type of
APC losses, namely DST+ABND and DAMAGED consecutively.
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Figure 104. Fraction of each type of APC loss relative to the total APC losses.
DAMAGED accounted for the largest amount of APC losses for the German side, while
DST+ABND accounted for the largest amount of APC losses for the Soviet side.
D. TYPE OF ARTILLERY LOSSES
Figure 110 shows the fraction of each type of Artillery loss relative to total
artillery losses. When both types of losses are considered, DST+ABND accounted for the
largest amount of artillery losses for both sides, and the Soviet DST+ABND fraction
(0.847) was significantly higher than the German fraction (0.559). Consequently,
DAMAGED accounted for the 44 (0.440) percent of artillery losses for the Germans
and 15 (0.152) percent of artillery losses for the Soviets. Overall, for every 1
DAMAGED Soviet Artillery, nearly 3 (2.545) German artillery was DAMAGED, and for
162
every 1 DST+ABND German artillery, almost 2 (1.718) Soviet artillery was
DST+ABND.
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Figure 106. Daily number of total APC losses that are DST+ABND. DST+ABND
denotes weapons that are destroyed or abandoned. Soviets had no APCs that are







Figure 107. Daily Cumulative number of total APC losses that are DST+ABND.
























D Soviet APC Damaged
German APC Damaged
Figure 108. Daily number of Total APC losses that are damaged. Soviets had no
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Figure 110. Fraction of each type of artillery losses relative to total artillery losses.
DST+ABND accounted for the largest amount of artillery losses for both sides.
165
Figure 1 1 1 shows the fraction of each type of artillery loss relative to initial
amount of OH artillery. When both types of losses are considered, again DST+ABND
accounted for the largest amount of artillery losses both for the German side and also for
the Soviet side. 6 (0.059) percent of the initial amount of OH German artillery was
DST+ABND, while 5 (0.047) percent was DAMAGED. 17(0.169) percent of the initial
amount of OH Soviet artillery was DST+ABND, while only almost one sixth of that
amount, i.e. 3 (0.030) percent, was DAMAGED.
Figures 1 12 through 1 15 show daily and cumulative Artillery losses for each type
of artillery losses namely DST+ABND and DAMAGED consecutively.
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Figure 111. Fraction of each type of loss relative to initial amount of artillery.
DST+ABND accounted for the largest amount of artillery losses for both the German
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Figure 112. Daily number of total artillery losses which are DST+ABND. DST+ABND
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Figure 113. Daily cumulative number of total artillery losses that are DST+ABND.
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Figure 1 14. Daily number of total artillery losses that are damaged. Soviets had no
damaged artillery on days 1,6, 11, 13, 14 and 15. Germans had no damaged artillery on
days 1 1 and 14.
Cumulative Artillery Damaged
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